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THE USE AND MISUSE OF PATENT LICENSES
Jonathan S. Masur
ABSTRACT-Patents are becoming an increasingly large business with ever
greater resources devoted to litigation and enforcement. At the center of
that business lie the damages that courts award at trial and the ways in
which courts go about calculating those damages. Yet the legal standards
meant to govern patent damages are notoriously ambiguous and unhelpful.
In the face of these difficulties, courts have sought a market mechanism
that would aid them in calculating patent damages. The solution they have
seized upon is to use existing licenses, typically granted by the plaintiff to
third parties, as evidence of the proper measure of damages. But the use of
existing licenses to measure reasonable royalty damages creates three
significant and distinct problems: first, it relies upon private information
available only to the parties to the preexisting licensing agreement; second,
it is ineluctably circular; and third, it creates incentives for the patent holder
to distort the value of the licenses it negotiates in order to mislead the court.
This Article describes and analyzes these three problems and then turns to
potential solutions. It evaluates a variety of possible reforms, including
selection of particular licenses for comparison or the application of a
multiplier to the value of existing licenses. Though several of these
solutions show promise, none come close to being a complete answer. It
may well be that courts have no choice but to largely ignore existing
licenses when calculating patent damages, leaving them more at sea than
ever.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2014 alone, patent holders filed approximately 5700 lawsuits in
federal court-and that substantial figure even represented a decline of
approximately 13% from the all-time high of approximately 6500 cases
filed in 2013.1 At the same time, the median patent damages award fell to
$2.0 million.2 This continued a fifteen-year downward trend and
represented the second lowest median damages award over the past twenty
years.' In combination, these two trends are striking. Patents are becoming
an increasingly large business with ever greater resources devoted to
litigation and enforcement. Yet at the same time that investments in
litigation have increased, the rewards that patent owners are able to realize
at trial have continued to decline.
These trends have been accompanied by renewed attention to damages
calculations from both the courts4 and the scholarly literature.' Part of the
I PwC, 2015 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 3 (2015), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/
publications/assets/2015-pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf [http://perma.cc/YU2H-88MJ] [hereinafter
PwC, 2015 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY]; PwC, 2014 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 2 (2014),
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2014-patent-litigation-study.pdf
[http://perma.cc/S9HP-2ASM].
2 PwC, 2015 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY, supra note 1, at 4.
3 Id. at 4.
4 See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1323-39 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Apple,
Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 12-CV-00630-LHK, 2014 WL 6687122 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2014)
(setting ongoing royalty payments); Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK,
2014 WL 549324 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2014) (denying Apple's request for additur following a second trial
on damages); In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 3, 2013); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (Posner, J.), aff'd
in part, revd in part, vacated in part, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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explanation for the heightened importance of monetary damages in patent
law is the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in eBay v. MercExchange.6 That
decision made it more difficult for prevailing patent plaintiffs to obtain
injunctions.' One of the primary benefits of granting an injunction was that
it often freed the judge from having to calculate damages, leaving that
determination to the parties.' With injunctions becoming less common in
cases where a patent holder prevails, the calculation of damages for patent
liability has moved closer to center stage.
Nonetheless, the renewed attention to patent damages has not
diminished the challenge of accurately calculating them at trial. In some
instances, the plaintiff and defendant are both practicing entities that
produce competing products.9 In these cases, the judge or jury has the
comparatively easier task of determining damages by estimating lost
profits: how many additional sales would the plaintiff have made had the
See, e.g., Stephen J. Conroy et al., The Case for Admitting Settlement License Agreements in a
Reasonable Royalty Analysis, 46 LES NOUVELLES 291 (2011); Merritt J. Hasbrouck, Protecting the
Gates of Reasonable Royalty: A Damages Framework for Patent Infringement Cases, 11 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 192, 215 (2011); John C. Jarosz & Michael J. Chapman, The Hypothetical
Negotiation and Reasonable Royalty Damages: The Tail Wagging the Dog, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
769 (2013); Layne S. Keele, Res "Q "ing Patent Infringement Damages After ResQNet: The Dangers of
Litigation Licenses as Evidence of a Reasonable Royalty, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 181, 205 (2012);
David 0. Taylor, Using Reasonable Royalties to Value Patented Technology, 49 GA. L. REV. 79 (2014);
Jaimeson Fedell, Note, A Step in the Right Direction: Patent Damages and the Elimination of the Entire
Market Value Rule, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1143, 1146-50 (2014).
6 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical
Study, IOWA L. REv. (forthcoming), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2632834
[http://perma.cc/H4PA-9U5H]; Kirti Gupta & Jay P. Kesan, Studying the Impact of eBay on Injunctive
Relief in Patent Cases (July 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2629399 [http://perma.cc/G482-8PE9]. Prior to eBay, there was a presumption
in favor of granting an injunction to a prevailing plaintiff in a patent case. eBay held that the usual rules
of equity applied and that courts might only grant an injunction when a four-factor test favored doing
so-which was not always the case. 547 U.S. at 391.
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1118 (1972) (noting that an injunction clarifies the
parties' rights, allowing them to return to the bargaining table and negotiate privately).
9 See, e.g., Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 637 F.3d
1269, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding "substantial evidence to support a lost profits award" based on
existence of "a two-supplier, high-end market"); DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1309-10
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that despite competitor's "attempts to suggest that the market included
numerous other noninfringing alternatives to [its device]... [patent owner] provided evidence that no
other non-infringing alternatives were acceptable during the necessary time periods"); Lam, Inc. v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[Iln a two-supplier market... [1]ost
profits may be in form of diverted sales, eroded prices, or increased expenses." (citation omitted));
Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
655, 655 (2009) ("Courts interpreting this provision have divided patent damages into two groups-lost
profits, available to patent owners who would have made sales in the absence of infringement, and
reasonable royalties, a fallback remedy for everyone else.").
117
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
defendant not infringed its patent?o Of course, one uses the word "easier"
advisedly; this task is far from simple. It can be tremendously difficult to
determine how many sales a patent holder lost because of the infringement,
or if it lost any at all. The patent may cover a feature that is largely
irrelevant to consumer decisions, or it may duplicate an equally attractive
noninfringing technology that the defendant could have employed instead.
Thus, determining lost profits requires a court to answer a complex
counterfactual-how many units would the plaintiff have sold absent the
infringement-without reliable access to much of the relevant information.
Not surprisingly, the legal guidance provided by the courts of appeals-
most notably the Panduit factors, after the case by the same name"-is
notoriously ambiguous and unhelpful.
However, in an increasing number of cases, the patent holder has no
lost profits, cannot prove lost profits, or simply does not wish to attempt to
do so. 12 In those cases, the patent plaintiff will instead seek a "reasonable
royalty," which the court must determine.' Over the past decade, courts
have used a reasonable royalty as the measure of damages in 81% of
cases. 14 Calculating lost profits is by no means trivial, but it is substantially
more determinate and straightforward than estimating a reasonable royalty.
10 See, e.g., Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
("Versata claimed this consisted of 93 lost sales, and it put forward evidence regarding demand, the
absence of noninfringing alternatives, and the capacity to sell Pricer in this market."); Micro Chem.,
Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d 1119, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("To recover lost profits a patentee must
show that 'but for' infringement it reasonably would have made the additional profits enjoyed by the
infringer."); King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 953 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("In determining the
amount of damages to which King was entitled, the district court considered: (1) the number of lost
sales; (2) the gross receipts [King] would have obtained from the lost sales had there been no
infringement [by Tapematic]; (3) the cost of sales to be deducted from gross receipts; and (4) [King's]
profit on the lost sales." (quoting King Instrument Corp. v. Perego, 737 F. Supp. 1227, 1241 (D. Mass.
1990)); see also SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVEs 206-10 (2004).
11 Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978). The four Panduit
factors are "(1) demand for the patented product, (2) absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes,
(3) his manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of the profit
he would have made." Id. at 1156.
12 In some but hardly all cases, this will occur because the patent owner is a nonpracticing entity
that does not produce a product and thus has no profits to lose. See Christopher A. Cotropia et al.,
Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649, 650-51 (2014); David L.
Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 380
(2012). On other occasions, the patent owner might simply believe that it is advantageous to pursue a
reasonable royalty instead. Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for
Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1676-77.
" 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012); see also Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In
effect, the Patent Act allows plaintiffs to select between the two options. Omri Ben-Shahar, Damages
for Unlicensed Use, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 8 (2011).
14 PwC, 2015 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY, supra note 1, at 8 fig.8. That is to say, courts employed
a reasonable royalty measure of damages in 81% of all cases in which the plaintiff was victorious and
the court awarded damages. Fewer than 81% of all patent cases end in a verdict for the plaintiff.
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To accomplish this latter task, a court must attempt to reconstruct a
hypothetical negotiation between patent plaintiff and defendant-which
likely never took place-and determine the amount of money for which the
two parties would have agreed to settle." Worse still, the legal guidance
provided to courts and juries is almost comically counterproductive. When
determining reasonable royalty damages, courts are instructed to consider
the influential fifteen-step Georgia-Pacific test,'6 a laundry list of factors
that shed little light on the appropriate dollar figures. The Federal Circuit
has (correctly) struck down more determinate types of guidance, such as
the "25% rule of thumb," according to which 25% of the defendant's
profits should be paid to a patent defendant as a reasonable royalty. 7
Similarly, it has (correctly) limited the number of situations in which a
court is permitted to calculate damages using the "entire market value
rule," whereby a court would base a reasonable royalty on the full price of
the product being sold, rather than the value of the particular patented
component." But the result has been to leave courts almost entirely at sea
and at the mercy of the parties' experts when attempting to assess
damages. 9 In combination, the elimination of the 25% rule and the limits
placed on the entire market value rule have left courts guessing about both
(1) the proper royalty rate and (2) the sales figure (the "royalty base") to
which it should apply that royalty rate. It is not surprising, then, that courts
have largely floundered when attempting to estimate reasonable royalties.
In the face of these difficulties, it is natural for courts to seek an
alternative means of estimating reasonable royalties. Again, one of the
principal disadvantages of the turn away from injunctive relief is that it
deprives courts of the opportunity to have the parties decide the value of a
1 See Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 5.
16 These factors derive their name from Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp.
1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Although Georgia-Pacific is merely a district court case, the Federal
Circuit has adopted it as the touchstone for computing reasonable royalty damages.
'7 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1 VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Courts may use the
entire market value rule only when "it can be shown that the patented feature drives the demand for an
entire multi-component product." LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 67 (Fed.
Cir. 2012). The elimination of the 25% rule and the entire market value rule are two respects in which
the Federal Circuit has made patents less valuable to their owners. It is not surprising that they appear in
the context of remedies for infringement, an issue that is never adjudicated by the Patent Trademark
Office (PTO) and is thus not subject to the inflationary effects of the PTO-Federal Circuit interaction.
See generally Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470 (2011).
19 For instance, it is much easier to price an entire product-which is being sold in the market-
than a particular component of that product, which might never be sold on its own for market value. See
Brian D. Coggio et al., Damage Control-What an Adjudged Infringer Can Do to Minimize the
Resulting Damage, 15 AIPLA Q.J. 250, 296 (1987) ("However, the relative difficulty of establishing
apportionment will operate in favor of the application of the entire market value rule.").
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patent through arms-length bargaining. An alternative market mechanism
that allows courts to use private valuations to accurately gauge patent
damages would be of obvious value. The solution that courts have arrived
at is to use existing licenses, typically granted by the plaintiff to third
parties, as evidence of the proper measure of damages. A patent license
offers the elusive holy grail: an arms-length transaction between two
private parties that places a monetary value on the patent. Indeed, the
measure of value provided by an existing license is the very first factor
listed in Georgia-Pacific for use in calculating reasonable royalty
damages.2 0 Courts have relied upon existing licenses in calculating
damages for decades, 21 and the practice has grown even more prominent in
recent years. 22 At first blush this approach makes sense; if the courts must
reconstruct a hypothetical royalty negotiation, actual preexisting royalty
agreements might well constitute the best available evidence of the
contours of such a negotiation. Not surprisingly, scholars, commentators,
and courts nearly unanimously bless the use of existing licenses to calculate
patent damages. 23
But the use of existing licenses to measure reasonable royalty
damages creates three significant and distinct problems. The first is that it
relies upon private information, available only to the parties to the first
licensing agreement, about the plaintiffs probability of success in
litigation. Every agreement to license a patent is necessarily made in the
shadow of the threat of litigation. If a patent holder had no means to
enforce its patent, no licensee would pay royalties for a license.
Accordingly, any negotiation over royalties will necessarily be based upon
the outcome the parties expect should the case go to trial.2 4 The parties will
20 318 F. Supp. at 1120 ("1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in
suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty.").
21 See Nickson Indus., Inc. v. Rol Mfg. Co., 847 F.2d 795 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
22 See, e.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2014); VirnetX,
767 F.3d at 1330-31; Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Versata
Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2013); LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at
77-78 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (validating the use of some licenses in determining damages and rejecting
others); Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Waterton
Polymer Prods. USA, LLC v. EdiZONE, LLC, No. 2:12-CV-17 TS, 2014 WL 5782710 (D. Utah Nov.
6, 2014); Ultratec, Inc. v. Sorenson Commc'ns, Inc., No. 13-cv-346-bbc, 2014 WL 5080411 (W.D.
Wis. Oct. 9, 2014); ReedHycalog UK, Ltd. v. Diamond Innovations Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 543 (E.D.
Tex. 2010); Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 2:06-CV-72 DF, 2010 WL 903259 (E.D.
Tex. Mar. 4, 2010); Spreadsheet Automation Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 587 F. Supp. 2d 794 (E.D. Tex.
2007).
23 See sources cited supra notes 4-5.
24 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1991, 1993 (2007); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); see also John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal
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have to account for the possibility that courts will find the patent invalid or
not infringed-the possibility, that is, that the licensee will not be forced to
pay anything.
This highlights the second, closely related problem with using existing
licenses to calculate reasonable royalty damages: the procedure is
ineluctably circular. Licensing agreements are based upon expected
damages awards at trial. But if damages awarded at trial are in turn based
upon licensing agreements, it creates an unconquerable chicken-and-egg
problem. Judicial error with regard to the appropriate measure of damages
will produce smaller royalty amounts outside of litigation, which will in
turn lead to lower judicial calculations of damages, which will then beget
even smaller royalty payments outside of litigation, and so forth.
The third problem stemming from the use of existing licenses is
common to any setting in which a contract between two parties, A and B,
will affect the rights of a third party, C. A and B will always have an
incentive to distort their contract to maximize their joint gains against C.
For instance, suppose that a patent owner P understands that the licensing
agreement it reaches with a licensee L; will affect the damages it obtains in
litigation against a second subsequent licensee, L2 , or the royalty it can
negotiate with a third subsequent licensee, L 3. P has a strong incentive to
inflate the value of its agreement with Li, perhaps in exchange for
providing L1 with something else of value. Courts must be vigilant in
policing licensing agreements for extraneous considerations before using
those agreements to estimate damages. At the same time, if courts are too
particular in requiring that an agreement include nothing but a license to
use a patented technology, they may find few existing licenses that can
serve as sound bases for calculating damages.
In light of these problems, the question is what role existing licenses
should play in judicial damages calculations. It would seem
counterproductive to throw away information about patent valuations when
such information is so scarce to begin with. But without some means of
accounting for the context within which parties negotiate licenses, there is
doubt as to whether existing licenses can provide reliable evidence of
reasonable royalty damages. The final Part of this Article considers a
variety of potential solutions to these problems. Though several of these
solutions show promise, none come close to being a complete answer. It
may well be that courts have no choice but to treat existing licenses as
Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); cf William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis ofthe Courts,
14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 66-69 (1971) (discussing negotiations in the criminal justice system).
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providing only the most limited of guidance when calculating damages at
trial.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the courts'
practice of using existing licenses to gauge reasonable royalty patent
damages and outlines the rules that courts have developed to guide that
practice. Part II analyzes the three problems inherent to using existing
licenses to calculate reasonable royalties: courts' inability to access the
private information that will unlock the license, the circularity involved in
relying upon existing licenses in damages calculations, and the incentives
to distort contracts when a contract between two parties is used to value
property or legal rights in a manner that affects a third party. Part III
considers a variety of potential mechanisms for solving these problems but
concludes that the difficulties they create cannot be entirely ameliorated.
The Article closes with an inquiry into whether there remains any viable
role for existing licenses in the setting of reasonable royalty damages at
trial.
I. LICENSING AGREEMENTS AND REASONABLE ROYALTY DAMAGES
When a patent plaintiff prevails at trial but cannot prove lost profits or
damages-or does not wish to try-the adjudicating court must instead
determine the reasonable royalty that an infringer should have paid the
patent holder to license the patent.2 5 The court must imagine a hypothetical
negotiation between the plaintiff and the defendant, conducted at the
moment before the defendant's infringement began,26 and determine the
royalty the two parties would have settled upon after bargaining at arm's
length. The court must further assume, for purposes of this hypothetical
negotiation, that both parties know the patent to be valid and infringed-as
the court has just found it to be.2 7 This inquiry is both hypothetical and well
after the fact, and it requires the court to forget many facts that it has
learned and imagine many others that it cannot know.2 8 It is naturally
25 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) ("Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable
royalty .... ).
26 See, e.g., Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 435 F.3d 1356, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir.
2006) ("[Tlhe hypothetical negotiation relates to the date of first infringement."); State Indus., Inc. v.
Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("The determination of a reasonable
royalty ... is based ... on what a willing licensor and licensee would bargain for at hypothetical
negotiations on the date infringement started.").
27 Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. 580 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Paul M.
Janicke, Contemporary Issues in Patent Damages, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 691, 722-23 (1993) (questioning
"whether the concept [of hypothetical negotiation] has outlived its usefulness").
28 The difficulties that courts encounter in trying to reconstruct this hypothetical negotiation are
further detailed in Parts II and III.
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fraught with both error and complication.29 The Federal Circuito has
compounded the situation by providing only amorphous guidance to the
lower courts. Courts awarding a reasonable royalty are instructed to apply
the fifteen-part test enumerated in Georgia-Pacific."' Almost needless to
say, lower courts have found this to be anything but a straightforward
task.3 2
It is thus not surprising that courts have grasped for sources of market
information, believing them superior to the court's own speculation and
hypothesizing. Georgia-Pacific itself encourages this; the very first
Georgia-Pacific factor is "[t]he royalties received by the patentee for the
licensing of the patent in suit,""3 and the second is "[t]he rates paid by the
licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in suit."3 4
Existing licenses-whether granted by the plaintiff for access to the patent
technology, or purchased by the defendant for similar technologies-are
thus front and center in reasonable royalty calculations.
But this does not mean that all licenses are treated equally. Federal
courts have evolved a set of rules to determine whether an existing license
will be admitted into evidence and, if admitted, what weight it will be
afforded." First and foremost is the sensible rule that the existing license in
question must involve a patent very similar (if not identical) to the patent in
suit. 6 A comparison is not valuable if it is not apples-to-apples or close to
29 See ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("Determining a fair
and reasonable royalty is often ... a difficult judicial chore, seeming often to involve more the talents
of a conjurer than those of a judge." (quoting Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568,
1574 (Fed. Cir. 1988))); see also Hasbrouck, supra note 5, at 193 ("Although the courts have made
some progress in other areas of patent law, one troublesome area remains: the appropriate standard for
determining a reasonable royalty damages amount.").
30 The Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction of final decisions of district courts in the
area of patent law. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012).
31 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
32 See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (Posner, J.)
("This is a formidable list.... And could a judge or a jury really balance 15 or more factors and come
up with anything resembling an objective assessment?"), af'd in part, rev d in part, vacated in part,
757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Bo Zeng, Note, Lucent v. Gateway: Putting the "Reasonable"
Back into Reasonable Royalties, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 329, 333 (2011) ("In essence, Georgia-
Pacific's hypothetical, individually-negotiated approach complicated reasonable royalty
determinations . . . .").
3 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
34 id
3 See Zelin Yang, Note, Damaging Royalties: An Overview of Reasonable Royalty Damages,
29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 647, 668-69 (2014) ("Although reasonable arguments could be made for each
of these factors to be the starting point in determining a royalty rate, the Federal Circuit has increased
the level of scrutiny in assessing whether licenses are truly 'comparable."').
36 See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("[D]amages
award[s] cannot stand solely on evidence which amounts to little more than a recitation of royalty
numbers . . . particularly when it is doubtful that the technology of those license agreements is in any
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it. Thus, existing licenses that bundle together multiple patents, or a patent
and something else of value (such as a trademark or trade secret), are
typically not accepted as valid comparisons."7 Similarly, courts disfavor
licenses for unrelated technology on the theory that they may be more or
less valuable than the technology in the patent at suit."8 In addition, courts
generally frown upon the use of one type of license-for instance, a lump
sum license-to calculate a different type of license, such as a running
royalty in which the defendant pays per unit sold over time."9 In practice,
this means that licenses granted by the patent ownerfor the same patent are
more commonly used in calculating damages than licenses taken by the
defendant on similar technologies.40
Second, and more important for present purposes, courts 41 and
commentators 42 generally disfavor licenses that parties negotiated as
way similar to the technology being litigated here."); see also LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput.,
Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 79 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("When relying on licenses to prove a reasonable royalty,
alleging a loose or vague comparability between different technologies or licenses does not suffice....
[We] insisted that the 'licenses relied [on] by the patentee in proving damages [be] sufficiently
comparable to the hypothetical license at issue in suit."' (second alteration in original) (quoting Lucent
Techs., 580 F.3d at 1325)).
37 See ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 873 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("In sum, the district
court erred by considering ResQNet's re-bundling licenses to significantly adjust upward the reasonable
royalty without any factual findings that accounted for the technological and economic differences
between those licenses and the '075 patent."); see also John Elmore, The Technological Comparability
of Patent License Agreements, 46 LES NOUVELLES 115, 116 (2011) ("[C]ase law cautions that patent
license agreements providing substantial non-patent benefits or multiple patents may not be comparable
to a 'straight' patent license.").
38 See ResQNet.com, 594 F.3d at 869 ("Any evidence unrelated to the claimed invention does not
support compensation for infringement but punishes beyond the reach of the statute.... This court has
long required district courts performing reasonable royalty calculations to exercise vigilance when
considering past licenses to technologies other than the patent in suit."); see also Zeng, supra note 32,
at 356 ("The Federal Circuit has eliminated unrelated past licenses from consideration in patent damage
analyses and should do so because every licensing agreement is unique.").
3 See, e.g., ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 2d 807, 814 (E.D. Va. 2011).
40 See Thomas F. Cotter, Four Principles for Calculating Reasonable Royalties in Patent
Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 725, 748 (2011) ("Strictly
speaking, then, for a license to be economically comparable it should relate to the same patent or
patents at issue .... ); Roy Weinstein et al., Taming Complex Intellectual Property Compensation
Problems, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 547, 553 (2013) ("In view of ResQNet and Lucent, comparable licenses can
only include licenses to the patent-in-suit itself, essentially removing from consideration licenses
contemplated under Georgia-Pacific Factors 2 and 12.").
41 See, e.g., Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078-79 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
("[S]ince the offers were made after the infringement had begun and litigation was threatened or
probable, their terms 'should not be considered evidence of an "established royalty" . . . .' (quoting
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1164 n.1 1(6th Cir. 1978))).
42 See, e.g., Keele, supra note 5, at 216 (arguing that licenses negotiated during litigation settlement
are highly prejudicial and rarely probative); Tejas N. Narechania & Jackson Taylor Kirklin, An
Unsettling Development: The Use of Settlement-Related Evidence for Damages Determinations in
Patent Litigation, 2012 J.L., TECH. & POL'Y 1, 32-36 (arguing that courts should bar all evidence
related to settlement of litigation disputes). A few scholars have argued that licenses negotiated as
settlements to litigation should be allowed into evidence when assessing damages, though this remains a
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settlements to ongoing litigation. Courts have reasoned that litigation
distorts the licensing prices that defendants are willing to pay, skewing the
prices upward. 43 According to these courts, the primary cause of this
distortion is the cost of litigating: in order to avoid litigation costs, patent
defendants might be willing to pay more than they otherwise would to
settle a dispute and license a patent." For many years, courts flatly refused
to consider any settlement under threat of litigation as reliable evidence of
a patent's value, 45  or at minimum the courts greatly discounted the
probative value of such a license.4 6 Those types of settlements were often
barred from evidence. However, in the 2010 case ResQNet v. Lansa,4 7 the
Federal Circuit appeared to invite consideration of licenses negotiated as
settlements to litigation, though they would be awarded less evidentiary
weight.48  Since 2010, courts have occasionally considered licenses
negotiated during litigation as indicators of patent value.49 By and large,
however, courts have continued to express a strong preference for licenses
minority viewpoint. See Michael J. Chapman, Using Settlement Licenses in Reasonable Royalty
Determinations, 49 IDEA 313, 315 (2009); Conroy et al., supra note 5, at 295-96.
43 In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1379
(N.D. Ill. 1993) ("[P]eople may settle patent litigation to reduce the costs of the legal process. The terms
of a settlement reflect these costs as well as the parties' estimates about the probable outcome on the
merits if the case proceeds."); Keele, supra note 5, at 205-06 (noting the effect of litigation costs on
settlement value).
4 Lumen View Tech., LLC v. Findthebest.com, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 3d 329, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
("Lumen's motivation in this litigation was to extract a nuisance settlement from FTB on the theory that
FTB would rather pay an unjustified license fee than bear the costs of the threatened expensive
litigation."); American Law Institute Study on Paths to a "Better Way": Litigation, Alternatives, and
Accommodation: Steering Committee Report, 1989 DUKE L.J. 811, 823 ("[T]lhe threat of
unreimbursable litigation costs can give weak claims a nuisance settlement value they do not deserve.");
J.P. Mello, Legal Update, Technology Licensing and Patent Trolls, 12 B.U. J. SC. & TECH. L. 388, 397
(2006) ("Patent trolls typically demand licenses that are significantly less than the expected cost that
each target company will incur in litigation. Thus, many target companies opt for the economically
efficient path and pay a license fee to the patent troll rather than incur litigation costs." (footnote
omitted)).
45 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 408; Rude v. Westcott, 130 U.S. 152, 164 (1889) ("[A] payment of any
sum in settlement of a claim for an alleged infringement cannot be taken as a standard to measure the
value of the improvements patented, in determining the damages sustained by the owners of the patent
in other cases of infringement."); JOHN SKENYON ET AL., PATENT DAMAGES LAW & PRACTICE § 3.17
(2013).
46 See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 710 F.2d 1551, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[A]s the
White license was negotiated against a backdrop of continuing litigation and [the defendant's]
infringement of the Schreiner patent, the district court could properly discount the probative value of
the White license with regard to a reasonable royalty.").
47 594 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
48 Id. at 870-72.
49 See, e.g., Automated Merch. Sys. Inc. v. Crane Co., 279 F.R.D. 366, 372-73 (N.D. W. Va.
2011); Small v. Nobel Biocare USA, LLC, 808 F. Supp. 2d 584, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Volumetrics
Med. Imaging, LLC v. Toshiba Am. Med. Sys., Inc., No. 1:05CV955, 2011 WL 2470460, at *14
(M.D.N.C. June 20, 2011).
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negotiated "in the wild"-outside of litigation. 0 These licenses form the
bulk of sources to which courts have turned for guidance in setting
reasonable royalty damages.'
LaserDynamics v. Quanta Computer provides an illustrative
example.5 2 There, the parties introduced into evidence twenty-nine prior
licenses of the patent in suit." On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that the
"vast majority" of these twenty-nine licenses had been negotiated outside
of litigation, and that those licenses provided the most reliable evidence of
the true value of the patent.5 4 The court then singled out for disapprobation
a license negotiated by a firm named BenQ that had arisen under unusual
circumstances:
This settlement agreement was executed within two weeks of the anticipated
trial against BenQ. By the time of the settlement, BenQ had been repeatedly
sanctioned by the district court for discovery misconduct and
misrepresentation. The district court had allotted BenQ one-third less time
than [the patent owner] for voir dire, opening statement, and closing
argument, had awarded attorneys' fees to [the patent owner] for bringing the
sanctions motion, had stricken one of BenQ's pleaded defenses, and had
sanctioned BenQ $500,000.00 as an additional punitive and deterrent
measure.5 5
Perhaps not surprisingly, BenQ agreed to license the patent for a great
deal more money than any of the other licensees. BenQ paid $6 million,
while none of the other licenses exceeded $1 million." The Federal Circuit
held that the district court had abused its discretion in admitting the BenQ
50 See, e.g., Ravo v. Covidien LP, 55 F. Supp. 3d 766, 775 (W.D. Pa. 2014) ("Settlement
agreements are generally not relevant 'because in the usual course they do not provide an accurate
reflection of what a willing licensor would do in an arm's length transaction."' (quoting Uniloc USA,
Inc., v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F. Supp. 2d 147, 159 (D.R.I. 2009))); Atlas IP, LLC v. Medtronic, Inc.,
No. 13-CIV-23309, 2014 WL 5741870, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2014) (refusing to consider a license
negotiated during litigation); Sentius Int'l, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 5:13-cv-00825-PSG, 2015 WL
451950, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2015) ("[S]uch licenses are hardly now per se admissible.").
Commentators, even those who have advocated giving nonzero weight to litigation settlements, have
expressed similar preferences for nonlitigation licenses. See Conroy et al., supra note 5, at 296
(suggesting that licenses negotiated as settlements to litigation should be admitted, but arguing that their
probative value should be vetted); Taylor, supra note 5, at 114-16 (arguing that licenses negotiated
outside of litigation are more probative of patent value than those negotiated as settlements to
litigation); Keele, supra note 5, at 207 ("The real question is not whether litigation licenses have
probative value, but whether the probative value is large enough and reliable enough to be worth the
effort of uncovering it.").
s1 See Yang, supra note 35, at 668-69.
52 694 F.3d 51 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
53 Id. at 78.
54 id




license into evidence.57 It declared that the "unique coercive circumstances"
surrounding this license made it a particularly unreliable gauge of the
patent's value."
There can be little doubt that BenQ's setbacks in its litigation against
LaserDynamics (the patent owner) contributed to its larger licensing figure.
Had BenQ not been embroiled in litigation against LaserDynamics, and had
it not been faring so poorly, it would very likely have settled for much
less-probably $1 million or less, in line with the other licensees.
Nonetheless, I wish to suggest that the Federal Circuit had it exactly
backwards: the BenQ license, and not the other twenty-eight licenses, was
the most accurate indication of the "true" value of the patent. The court
should have admitted the BenQ license and excluded the others, or at least
afforded them little weight. More generally, courts' approach to using
existing licenses to determine patent damages at trial is both incoherent and
backwards-a rare combination. Courts misunderstand patent licenses at
their foundation and in so doing have devised doctrines that are not merely
misguided but counterproductive. The next Part explains how courts have
gone astray, and the final Part investigates what might be done to correct
them.
II. THREE BARRIERS TO USING EXISTING LICENSES
A. Existing Licenses and Private Information
No one would ever license a patent absent the threat of litigation. If a
patent holder could not threaten to enforce its patent against a putative
licensee in court, the licensee would have no reason to negotiate a license
in the first place." Patent licenses are best understood as civil settlements in
anticipation of possible litigation. 60
17 Id at 78.
58 Id.
59 Keele, supra note 5, at 205 ("Royalties are usually paid to avoid litigation-most people who
thought that they could infringe a patent with impunity would likely do so."); see also Dov Greenbaum,
Academia to Industry Technology Transfer. An Alternative to the Bayh-Dole System for Both
Developed and Developing Nations, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 311, 388 (2009)
("[W]ith no potential enforcement by the owner of the IP, potential licensees may see no incentive to
ever license the patent; infringing at will."); Brian Fung, The Man Who Invented Priceline.com Wants
to Shake Up America's Approach to Patents, WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Jan. 2, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2015/01/02/the-man-who-invented-priceline-
com-wants-to-shake-up-americas-patents/ [http://perma.cc/D7SP-65LL?] ("I learned very quickly that
nobody wanted to license my solutions unless I threatened to sue them-and in most cases, when I
actually sued them .... .").
60 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 24, at 1993 (analyzing licenses as litigation settlements); see
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Accordingly, the licensing fee for a given patent will depend upon the
parties' expected outcomes at trial.6 That is not to say that licensing
amounts are driven only by expected trial outcomes. The cost of going to
trial (among many other factors) will factor into the parties' calculations as
well, and thus in some cases, patent holders may be able to obtain licensing
fees greater than the expected outcome at trial.6 2 But expected trial
outcomes will necessarily play a significant role. To win at trial, the
plaintiff has to show both that the patent is valid and that the defendant
infringed the patent. Thus the set of potential trial outcomes includes the
possibility that the patent will be found invalid, or that the court will find
that the defendant did not infringe the patent, and thus that there will be no
award of damages.63 In formal terms, the plaintiffs expected outcome at
trial is p x d - c, where p is the probability that the patent will be held valid
and enforced, d is the likely amount of damages the court will assess, and c
is the cost of litigation. Conversely, the defendant's expected payout is p
x d + c. The plaintiff will be willing to grant a license-that is, settle-for
any amount greater than p x d - c, while the defendant will be willing to
purchase a license for any amount less than p x d + c. Accordingly, if the
two parties are able to agree upon a license, it will be for a royalty R such
that p x d - c < R < p x d + c. 65 The midpoint of that range is p x d, and
61 Keele, supra note 5, at 205-06.
62 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 24, at 2000-09 (analyzing mechanisms that can drive licensing
prices upward).
63 Keele, supra note 5, at 205-06 ("Like any other settlement, the amount a party is willing to pay
or accept for a litigation license . .. generally consists of three core components: the likelihood of
liability ... ; the expectation value of the damages . . ; and the party's expected litigation costs .... ).
6 To be clear, this highly simplified model is not meant to be perfectly representative of reality.
There are undoubtedly many other factors that affect licensing and settlement, including the fact that
litigation costs are not equivalent between plaintiffs and defendants, the threat of holdup, the possibility
of enhanced damages, risk tolerance on both sides, strategic behavior by repeat players, the time value
of money, the fact that the defendant might be insured, and the asymmetric risk that the court might
invalidate the patent-to name just a few. Yet by oversimplifying in this fashion, I am stacking the deck
in favor of the manner in which courts use licenses, and against this Article's argument that licenses are
not reliable indicators of patent value. The more that a license is influenced by factors other than the
value of the patent and the underlying technology, such as the factors listed above, the less useful the
license will be as a guide to patent value.
For that matter, the parties might arrive at a bargained-for settlement price without agreeing on
eitherp or d. (One party might believe that p is 100% and d is $10 million, while the other party might
believe that p is 50% and d is $20 million.) If the parties to the license do not agree on d, then the
license can hardly be used to value the patent once it is found valid and infringed. Here, by assuming
that the parties to a license agree on p and d, I am again stacking the deck against this Article's
argument that existing licenses are not useful measures of damages. A contrary assumption would only
make the Article's argument even stronger.
65 Cf Landes, supra note 24, at 67-69 (analyzing a model of criminal trial settlement in which




thus the parties should be expected to agree upon a royalty in the vicinity of
p x d. Thus, R zp x d.
By way of example, imagine that a patent holder (P) and a putative
licensee (LI) are negotiating a license over a particular piece of patented
technology. Suppose the parties recognize that a court is only 25% likely to
hold the patent valid and infringed by Li. Suppose further that the parties
agree that if the patent is found valid and infringed, the court is likely to
assess $20 million in reasonable royalty damages. Finally, suppose that the
patent litigation will cost each party $2 million. The patent holder's
expected outcome from trial is $20 million x 25% - $2 million = $3
million. The putative licensee's expected trial outcome is -$20 million x
25% - $2 million = -$7 million. P would be willing to grant a license for
any amount greater than $3 million; L1 would be willing to pay anything
less than $7 million. The parties should be expected to negotiate a
reasonable royalty near the midpoint of those two figures: approximately
$5 million.66 The license that the parties eventually negotiate will be driven
by the expected damages at trial as well as the likelihood that the patent
will be found valid and infringed in the first instance.67
Now imagine that P sues a second putative infringer (or licensee) L2
for infringing the same patent. The case goes to trial, and P wins: the court
holds that the patent is valid and has been infringed by L 2. In order to
determine damages, the court is expected to assess the outcome of a
hypothetical negotiation between P and L2 in which the parties agree upon
a reasonable royalty. Under governing Federal Circuit law, the court must
assume that this hypothetical negotiation took place immediately before the
moment of infringement-before L2 began its infringing activities.68
Critically, however, the court must also assume that the patent is valid and
infringed and that both parties know it to be valid and infringed.69 In that
66 John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Hedonic Adaptation and the
Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1521-22 (2008).
67 See Taylor, supra note 5, at 115 ("Negotiated royalties thus include discounts based on risk
borne by the patent owner associated with proving liability, relief, and enforceability. . . .").
68 Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("[T]he hypothetical
negotiation or the 'willing licensor-willing licensee' approach, attempts to ascertain the royalty upon
which the parties would have agreed had they successfully negotiated an agreement just before
infringement began."). This means that under governing Federal Circuit law, the court must ignore
everything that has occurred since the moment the infringement began, including all more recent
developments with the patented technology. This is a tall order. Scholars have proposed sophisticated
alternatives to this approach, though courts have not yet adopted them. See, e.g., Norman Siebrasse &
Thomas F. Cotter, A New Framework for Determining Reasonable Royalties in Patent Litigation,
U. FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2528616
[http://perma.cc/M6LM-6VQZ].
69 Lucent Techs., 580 F.3d at 1325 ("The hypothetical negotiation also assumes that the asserted
patent claims are valid and infringed."); see also LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc. 694 F.3d
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sense, the trial has officially resolved any ambiguity or uncertainty that
previously surrounded the patent. As a matter of law, P has prevailed over
L2, with all of the attendant consequences.70
The court is thus faced with the task of reconstructing the price that L2
would have paid to license the patent from P if both parties had agreed that
the patent was valid and infringed. It is natural for a court to look to the
existing license between P and Li for guidance. But when that license was
negotiated, the parties could not have been certain that the patent was valid
and infringed-or, at minimum, there is no way for a court to know
whether P and Li believed that the patent was valid and infringed and no
reason to believe that they viewed it as a certainty. That is private
information, inaccessible to the court. P and L1 might have believed that it
was 100% likely or nearly 100% likely that the patent was valid and
infringed; or they might have believed it to be 50% likely, or 25% likely, as
in this hypothetical.
Accordingly, the court should not simply use the licensing figure from
the agreement between P and Li-$5 million-when calculating damages
in the P v. L2 litigation. The parties negotiated the $5 million royalty with
the understanding that there was some (likely nonzero) probability that the
patent would not be found valid and infringed. Now that P has prevailed in
its suit against L2 , that probabilistic inquiry has been resolved in favor of P.
The court is expected to assess damages as if the parties were negotiating
under the belief that the patent was valid and infringed. If the court is to use
the license between P and Li as evidence of damages in the litigation
against L 2 , it must determine the fee P and L, would have agreed upon had
they believed that the patent was 100% likely to be valid and infringed.
But the court cannot determine this hypothetical licensing fee without
knowing what P and L; believed were their probabilities of success at trial.
51, 77 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("[T]he premise of which assumes . .. validity and infringement of the patent
not being disputed.").
70 Most scholars and practitioners of patent law understand that patents are probabilistic entities
through and through. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75
(2005) (summarizing and analyzing this mode of thinking about patents). Patents that are valid with
100% certainty or infringed by a given technology with 100% certainty are like the Loch Ness Monster:
various people claim to have seen them, but most informed parties realize that they cannot possibly
exist. Most patent scholars would say the same thing about even patents that have been adjudicated. Just
because one court (or jury) has found a patent valid and infringed is not a necessary guarantee that a
different court or jury would have reached the same result. See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes
Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV.
223 (2008) (demonstrating that even very experienced trial courts have their patent decisions overruled
at a high rate). Nonetheless, it is inherent to a court's self-image and the very nature of a trial that the
law would view the decision of a court as final and determinative-at least with respect to the parties




That is, the court is attempting to determine d-the parties' view of what
damages a court would assess if the patent were found valid and
infringed-by observing R, the actual royalty that the parties negotiated.
But d is not the same as R; the negotiated royalty R would normally be
approximately p x d, where p is the probability that the patent will be found
valid and infringed. By simple rearrangement, d z R /p. That is to say, a
court cannot use an existing royalty (R) to determine what damages it
should assess (d) without knowing p, the probability of success that the
parties assigned to the patent."1 And there is almost no way for the court to
reliably determine p, absent unusual circumstances (to be discussed later).
The expected probability of success on the merits, p, is the parties' private
information, unknowable to the court. There is no way for the court to
determine what probabilities P and Li assigned to the patent litigation
merely from scrutinizing the licensing agreement. The court can hardly
force representatives of the two sides to testify to their internal perceptions
of the patent at the time of the settlement.72 And without that information,
the court cannot use the existing license to reliably estimate the value of the
patent. All it can know is that P and L; valued the patent-if valid and
infringed-at no less than $5 million. The existing license thus provides a
floor for valuing the patent, not a reasonable estimate.
The problem is caused in large part because the court, in
reconstructing the hypothetical negotiation, must assume that the parties
agreed the patent was valid and infringed. This is contrary to what the
parties actually believed, which is what makes it necessary for the court to
determine their actual beliefs regarding the likelihood the patent would be
found valid and infringed.
Yet it is easy to see that it would be error for the courts to drop the
rule that the patent should be assumed valid and infringed for purposes of
the hypothetical negotiation. That is, it is easy to see that it would be error
for the court to simply assess damages against L 2 equal to the amount of the
71 Of course, it is entirely possible that the two parties involved in a license-P and L,-did not
actually agree on the probability that the patent was valid and infringed. P might have thought that the
patent was 50% likely to be valid and infringed and believed that a court would award it $10 million if
it prevailed at trial, while L; might have believed that the patent was only 25% likely to be valid and
infringed but anticipated a $20 million verdict if P prevailed. The two parties would have arrived at the
same licensing figure through different routes. (If they arrive at different licensing figures, with P's
substantially higher, then they will not be able to negotiate a license and will end up in litigation.) If this
is the case, then the existing license is an even less valuable guide to the damages calculation. Instead of
it being difficult or impossible for the court to determine the parties' joint belief about the proper
amount of damages, there is nojoint belief The court might as well ignore the license. In this respect,
the analysis that follows stacks the deck in favor of using existing licenses to assess patent damages. If
this analysis nonetheless compels the conclusion that existing licenses are not reliable guides to patent
damages, it will not be for lack of having granted those licenses the benefit of the doubt.
72 This point is developed further in Section III.B.
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prior license-here, $5 million." L2 would understand that if it chose to
litigate against P and lost, it would likely face damages of $5 million-the
amount of the licensing agreement between P and Li. But if it only faced
damages of $5 million if it lost at trial, why would it be willing to pay $5
million for a license?74 The answer is that it would not. Going to trial would
represent a "heads I win, tails we tie" situation for L 2. The best-case
scenario would be for L 2 to win at trial and owe P nothing; the worst-case
scenario would be for it to lose and owe P just $5 million, the amount that
L; paid P for the license.
Accordingly, L 2 would only be willing to pay P a royalty that is
discounted to reflect the probability that P will win at trial. Imagine that
P's probability of success in a suit against L2 is still only 25%. (The
litigation between P and L; might have established that the patent is almost
certainly valid, but L2'S product might not infringe.)" In this case, L 2 'S
expected outcome, should it go to trial, is only $5 million x 25% = $1.25
million. P and L 2 will likely settle for approximately that amount. This
stands in stark contrast to the $5 million license that P negotiated with L1 .
The value of the patent has been artificially depressed by the court's failure
to adhere to the rule that patents must be assumed valid and infringed for
purposes of constructing the hypothetical negotiation.
Stated more formally, P and L, negotiated a royalty R where R d x
p. Suppose the court adopts a legal rule that it will award damages in the
amount of R, rather than attempting to determine d. L2 recognizes that if it
loses at trial, it will only be forced to pay d x p. Accordingly, it is only
willing to settle for (d x p) x p, or d x p 2 . The court's failure to understand
that prior licenses are discounted by the probability of success at trial, and
its use of such licenses as guidelines for subsequent damages awards,
artificially reduce the value of the patent and the royalties that patent
holders will receive.76
7 Contra Cotter, supra note 40, at 752-53 (arguing precisely the opposite).
74 This analysis deliberately ignores litigation costs, which are discussed earlier.
7 The fact that a patent has been judged valid in one trial does not necessarily mean that it must or
will be judged valid in another. Under the doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel, a patent plaintiffs
judgment against one party is not binding against a different party who was not involved in the initial
case. See Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621, 627 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that an
earlier determination of patent validity had no stare decisis effect); Timothy Denny Greene, "All
Substantial Rights": Toward Sensible Patent Licensee Standing, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 14-19 (2012).
However, the initial validity judgment is still persuasive precedent, and so as a practical matter, a patent
that has once been found valid is likely to be found valid again. Gillette Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son,
Inc., 919 F.2d 720, 723 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("The fact that the validity of those claims has previously been
upheld in an earlier litigation is also to be given weight, though not stare decisis effect.").
76 See, e.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys. Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1225-28 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (making
this error); VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1330-31 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (same); Versata




The preceding analysis should make clear that the use of past licenses
to determine patent damages is plagued by a fundamental problem of
circularity. Licenses are necessarily negotiated in the shadow of trial: the
royalty depends upon the parties' expected outcomes at trial." When courts
use existing licenses to determine damages at trial, the tiger is chasing its
own tail. Trial outcomes cannot depend on licenses if licenses depend on
trial outcomes."
Treating an existing licensing agreement as if it represents a true
valuation of a valid and infringed patent will force the patent into an
artificial downward spiral in value. A license will drive expected trial
outcomes lower, which will in turn drive future licenses lower, which will
in turn drive future expected trial outcomes even lower, and so forth. This
type of positive feedback loop is unsustainable and will lead to ever greater
distortions.
This spiral will result even if the patent is never litigated. It relies only
on parties correctly understanding how a court will behave and how it will
treat existing licenses. Consider the previous example, in which L, agrees
to license P's patent for $5 million, with both parties calculating that P is
approximately 25% likely to succeed at trial and the court likely to award
$20 million in damages if P prevails. Suppose that P now approaches L 2
and threatens litigation if L 2 does not agree to license the patent. If both P
and L2 understand that the court will use the licensing agreement between P
and L; to set damages in the trial, then the two parties will recognize that L2
faces only $5 million in potential liability if it goes to trial. Accordingly, if
P is 25% likely to prevail at trial, L 2 will agree to license the patent for
approximately $1.25 million."
Now suppose that P approaches L 3 and again threatens litigation if L3
does not agree to license the patent. What royalty can they be expected to
negotiate? There are now two existing licenses: the $5 million license
between P and L, and the $1.25 million license between P and L 2 . Suppose
that L3 , like L2 and L1 , is 25% likely to be held liable for infringement in the
v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 66 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (same); Finjan, Inc., v. Secure Computing
Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (same).
7 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 24, at 2021-22 (discussing the effects of bargaining in the shadow
of trial on licensing behavior); see also John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L.
REV. 505, 566 (2010).
78 See Mark Schankerman & Suzanne Scotchmer, Damages and Injunctions in Protecting
Intellectual Property, 32 RAND J. EcoN. 199, 200 (2001); Taylor, supra note 5, at 115-16.
79 See Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive
Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535, 553-54 (2008) (demonstrating the decline in licensing
values for a two-period licensing game).
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event of a trial. What liability would L3 face? If the court were (incorrectly)
treating existing licenses as indicative of a patent's value, it would likely
assess damages in an amount between $1.25 million (the less expensive
license) and $5 million (the more expensive license). The midpoint of that
range-$3.125 million-is a reasonable estimate. If P and L 3 understand
this fact, then they would likely negotiate a license for approximately 25%
of $3.125 million, or approximately $780,000.0 As P negotiates
sequentially with L1, L2, and L 3 , the value of the patent has decreased from
$5 million to $1.25 million to $780,000, all without the patent ever seeing
the inside of a courtroom."' The downward spiral is driven entirely by the
parties' belief that the court will improperly rely upon prior licenses as
evidence of the patent's value.8 2
As much as courts would like to rely upon market measures in
estimating damages, there is no reliable route out of this circularity." The
reason is that patent licensing fees can only ever be grounded in a threat of
suit, and thus in the parties' best estimate of what a court will force them to
pay. There is simply no reason to license a patent other than to alleviate the
threat of suit. It is not as if any technology is actually being transferred
when a patent is licensed; the public patent document already discloses the
technology on its face, and a putative licensee can read the patent without
so $781,250, to be exact.
81 These numbers are of course merely hypothetical; the precise metes and bounds of this
downward spiral will depend on the values at issue in any given case. The more general point is that
this decay in value will occur in any case in which the patent owner is less than 100% certain to prevail.
In practice, that means that it will occur in every case; no patent owner can ever be completely assured
of victory.
82 Of course, some scholars have theorized that licensing fees are already too high, driven upward
by the patent owner's ability to obtain an injunction or courts' own miscalculations. See, e.g., Lemley &
Shapiro, supra note 24, at 2019 (analyzing various dynamics that can lead to excessive licensing
royalties and patent damages). Some might suggest that the downward spiral caused by misuse of
existing licenses is a necessary corrective to this trend. This is not impossible, but it is highly unlikely.
If the two effects balance one another, it would be through sheer fortuity. No sound long-term legal
regime should rely on courts making two types of legal mistakes, and hoping that each mistake
counteracts the other. It is far better to attempt to correct both mistakes. Here, that means grappling with
the problems of private information and circularity endemic to existing licenses.
In addition, other scholars have pointed out that under certain circumstances it does not matter
whether particular damage awards are too high or too low, only that average expected damages are
correct. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996). However, the problem here is that the use of existing licenses
to calculate patent damages will consistently bias damages downward. See Golden, supra note 77, at
569.
8 Contra Taylor, supra note 5, at 142-43 (suggesting that making certain assumptions about
infringement and validity offers a "partial solution" to this circularity). As this Section and the Sections
that follow will explain, there is no egress from this circularity. Indeed, it is the circularity that renders
insurmountable the problems created when courts base patent damages on existing licenses.
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licensing it.84 It is of course possible that the patent holder would transfer
technical knowledge along with a license for the patent," and this latent
knowledge may well be more valuable than any technical information
disclosed by the patent itself.6 But this transfer amounts to a provision of
valuable information and services above and beyond a license for the patent
itself. Courts have regularly refused to use licenses that involve a transfer
of more than just patent rights as a guide to patent damages in litigation.87
This is appropriate; if a patent licensing agreement simultaneously involves
the transfer of what amounts to a valuable trade secret, it cannot serve as a
reliable guide to pricing a patent license that involves no such transfer."8
The point is that patent licenses are inherently parasitic on litigation:
without the threat of litigation, there would be no licensing. This is why it
is incoherent for courts to refuse to consider licenses negotiated during
litigation or the threat of litigation. Whether the courts realize it or not,
there is no other context in which licenses might arise. If licenses are
parasitic upon litigation, litigation cannot also rely upon licenses for
guidance. At the heart of judicial practice lies a conceptual impossibility.
What, then, is the "true" value of a patent? The problem, as I have
argued, is that there is no inherent value to the patent-it is worth only
what a court will force a party to pay. One possible way out of this
quagmire is that a patent is worth whatever price the parties would bargain
84 See Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Does Patent Licensing Mean Innovation? 27 (Stanford
Law Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 473, 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2565292 [http://perma.cc/Q3EW-S6BR] (surveying
parties involved in patent licensing and finding that licenses rarely involve the transfer of technical
information).
8s See Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and Organizational
Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REv. 1503 (2012) (describing the transfer of tacit
information that often accompanies patents).
86 See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
545, 548-49 (2012) (surveying scientists on their use of the information disclosed in patents and finding
that patents are less than perfect disclosure devices).
87 See, e.g., ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 870 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("Dr. David
based his damages on seven ResQNet licenses, five of which had no relation to the claimed invention.
These five re-branding or re-bundling licenses ... furnished finished software products and source
code, as well as services such as training, maintenance, marketing, and upgrades, to other software
companies in exchange for ongoing revenue-based royalties.").
88 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 847 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ("Damages
experts cannot use non-comparable licenses, with little relationship to the claimed invention or parties-
in-suit, as a basis for calculating reasonable royalties."); see also Axcess Int'l, Inc. v. Savi Techs., Inc.,
No. 3:10-cv-1033-F, 2013 WL 6839112, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2013) ("With regard to the non-
comparable licensing agreements analyzed by Dr. Hakala, the Court is of the opinion that they provide
no assistance to his analysis. The Federal Circuit has made clear that '[a]ny evidence unrelated to the
claimed invention does not support compensation for infringement but punishes beyond the reach of the
statute.' Therefore, such analysis fails to 'carefully tie proof of damages to the claimed invention's
footprint in the market place."' (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting ResQNet.com,
594 F.3d at 869)).
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to if the court found the patent valid and infringed and awarded an
injunction to the patent holder. But this answer is both unhelpful in practice
and untrue in theory. As a theoretical matter, the prices that defendants pay
to lift injunctions often reflect the possibility of holdup, assuming the
defendants have already invested in producing the infringing good."9 These
holdup costs are an artifact of the plaintiff having the defendant over a
barrel, not a true measure of what the defendant would have paid before the
infringement began."o And in practice, injunctions are sufficiently rare that
it is unlikely that a court will find any to use as a model. What are the odds
that a particular patent plaintiff would have previously won a verdict
against another defendant, been granted an injunction, and then licensed the
patent to the defendant? Given the turn against injunctions-the point with
which this Article begins-this circumstance must be very uncommon.
Accordingly, it makes sense to think of a patent's value as whatever a
court would force a defendant to pay, absent any consideration of existing
licenses. That is to say, it is whatever figure a court would arrive at after
using the Georgia-Pacific factors other than the factors that direct a court
to consider existing licenses. These factors include "[t]he nature and scope
of the license," "[t]he established profitability of the product," "[tihe utility
and advantages of the patent .. . over the old modes or devices," "[t]he
extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention[] and ... the
value of that use," and so forth." If courts rely upon these economic
factors, and licensing fees are based upon these court decisions, there is no
circularity. This is the only coherent and practical way to conceptualize the
value of a patent. The problem is that it is difficult for courts to estimate
these values-hence the desire for market measures in the first place.
Of course, the problem of circularity is not unique to patent law. At a
deep level, the value of goods and legal rights in the marketplace will
always depend to at least some degree on predicted outcomes in court.
89 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 24, at 1993 (analyzing various dynamics that can lead to
excessive licensing royalties and patent damages).
90 See Norman V. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, The Value of the Standard 9-10 (Univ. of Minn.
Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 15-21, 2015), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2636445 [http://perma.cc/2RX9-8PS7]. The problem of holdup will persist
regardless of the timing of the suit for infringement and the behavior it covers. This is the case even
when liability is only triggered when an infringer is put on notice of a patent, as is the case in suits for
indirect infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) and (c), thus forcing the patent holder to engage in a
costly search to enforce the patent. See Jonathan S. Masur, Patent Liability Rules as Search Rules,
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 187 (2011). Even in such cases, the alleged infringer may have already made
technology-specific investments that create the possibility of holdup.
91 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see
also Taylor, supra note 5, at 85-89 (proposing a similar approach and using the language differentiating
between the "value of the patent rights" and the "value of the patented technology").
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Whenever a court uses a market transaction to value a good or a legal right,
the potential for circularity exists. This is most evident in negotiations over
a surplus, where there is no clear right or wrong answer. For instance, a
union and an employer bargaining over wages will sometimes agree to
submit the dispute to arbitration. In deciding the case, the arbitrator will
often look to agreements that similarly situated parties have reached in the
past. Those past agreements, in turn, will depend to at least some degree on
what the parties would have expected an arbitrator to decide. Private
contracts and arbitration decisions are locked in a circle. Other legal issues,
such as the standard of care in tort law, can similarly give rise to
circularities. If the standard of care depends on standard industry practices,
and standard industry practices depend on the level of care a court deems
necessary, the same type of circularity arises.
In most cases, however, the influence of judicial decisions on market
values is very slight. Imagine a situation in which A steals B's bicycle and
B sues A for compensation. If a court finds for B, it will presumably look to
the market price of the bicycle to determine the appropriate compensation.
At some very deep level, that market price could depend on a judicial
decision. A putative bicycle purchaser might instead consider stealing the
bicycle and taking his chances in court. In reality, though, bicycle
ownership rights are backed by threat of injunction, jail time, reputational
sanctions, or any number of other factors beyond the price a thief will be
forced to pay. There is no real circularity. Similarly, one could imagine a
world in which housing prices on the private market depended on the "just
compensation" a government would be forced to pay if it took the property
in eminent domain. If this were the case, a circularity would arise because
just compensation typically depends on market prices. The reality,
however, is that governments take property through eminent domain only
very rarely. The probability that a given property is ever subject to eminent
domain is very low. Accordingly, for the most part, private parties will buy
and sell property without considering the compensation it might fetch in an
eminent domain proceeding. The general irrelevance of eminent domain to
private market prices is what avoids creating a circularity in the housing
market.
Patent law has no such escape. Although the problem of circularity in
valuation is not unique to patent law, it is especially stark and critical in
that context. Unlike most other goods, the value of a patent depends
entirely on its likely fate in court. Courts, for their part, have emphasized
their desire to rely upon existing licenses to value patents whenever
possible. The circularity problem thus squarely infects a broad swath of
137
110:115 (2015)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
patent cases, and it does so with a sharpness that no other area of law can
match.
C. Contracts with Third-Party Effects
The use of existing licensing agreements to determine patent damages
raises another problem common to a wide variety of contracts that affect
the rights and duties of third parties: it creates incentives to manipulate the
value of the contract. Judicial use of licenses in valuing patents rests on the
notion that the patent is being negotiated at arm's length between two
parties who are dividing a joint surplus.9 2 That is, neither party has any
incentive to give the other side any consideration beyond what it is due in
the course of the negotiation.93 In other words, for a license to be reliable
evidence, a court must believe that the parties are operating in good faith
and at arm's length to value the patent. The reliability of the license
depends on the presumed behavior of the parties.
But in many contractual settings, including many patent licenses, the
two parties to the contract are not the only ones whose rights or interests
may be at issue. There is of course a well-known body of literature in the
law of contracts on third-party beneficiaries to contracts. 9 4 But the issue of
third parties arises with special force when a contract between A and B
affects how a court will value some property or service in future litigation
between A and a third party, C. For instance, imagine a contract between an
automobile owner A and insurer B. A contracts with B to insure A's
automobile in the amount of $10,000 and pays a premium based upon that
amount. Under normal circumstances, A has no reason to insure the
92 Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("The hypothetical negotiation [for reasonable royalty] seeks to determine the
terms of the license agreement the parties would have reached had they negotiated at arms length when
infringement began."); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
("Two alternative categories of infringement compensation are the patentee's lost profits and the
reasonable royalty he would have received through arms-length bargaining."); Mark A. Lemley & Carl
Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents,
28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1147 (2013) ("Under patent law, a reasonable royalty normally is based
on a hypothetical, arms-length negotiation between a willing buyer and a willing seller that takes place
at the time the infringement begins.").
93 This is also true as a general matter. Courts typically use recent sales, negotiated at arm's length,
as an indication of fair market value, absent some reason to believe otherwise. See, e.g., Schonfeld v.
Hilliard, 218 F.3d 164, 178 (2d Cir. 2000).
94 See, e.g., HOWARD 0. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 20:1-20 (rev. ed. 2014);
9 JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 43.1-2 (rev. ed. 2014); 13 SAMUEL WILLISTON &
RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 37.1-64 (4th ed. 2013); Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358 (1992); Anthony Jon Waters, The
Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1109 (1985);
Robert S. Adelson, Note, Third Party Beneficiary and Implied Right ofAction Analysis: The Fiction of
One Governmental Intent, 94 YALE L.J. 875 (1985).
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automobile for more than it is worth (unless A plans to commit fraud).9 5
The greater A's insured amount, the higher the premium that A must pay.9 6
A has no reason to pay a premium to purchase insurance greater than the
amount of loss that A will actually suffer.97
Now suppose that A has reason to believe that A is likely to be
involved in an automobile accident in which the other driver is at fault.
(Perhaps A drives a substantial distance each day and has noticed a
significant number of reckless drivers along the route.) If A's automobile is
wrecked in an accident with a third-party driver C, and C is at fault, C will
be liable to A for the value of the automobile. A court might attempt to
assess that value independently, by scrutinizing the make, model, year, and
prior condition of the automobile, but that task could be complicated
because the automobile is now in pieces. Alternatively, the court might
attempt to value the automobile by looking to the value of the insurance
agreement between A and B.
This creates an incentive for A to insure the automobile for more than
it is worth. If the automobile is worth only $8000 to A, but the court assigns
it a value of $10,000 because A has contracted for insurance in that amount,
A will pocket a profit of $2000 after C totals A's car. Depending upon the
additional premium that A must pay to insure the automobile for $10,000
rather than $8000 and A's perception of the probability that the automobile
will be damaged by a third party, A may have an entirely rational reason for
insuring the automobile for more than it is worth.98 In essence, A can use
the contract with B (the insurer) to artificially inflate the perceived value of
the automobile, anticipating that a third party (C) will later be forced to
make a payment based upon that inflated value.
95 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Efficient Responses to Catastrophic Risk, 6 CHI. J. INr'L L. 511,
523 (2006) (explaining that there is no reason to expend resources beyond the point at which marginal
costs exceed marginal benefits, and thus beyond the point at which there would be insurance for more
than the value of a loss).
96 Ronen Avraham, The Economics ofInsurance Law-A Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 29, 58 (2012);
see also Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs ofAccidents: Pain-and-Suffering
Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1785, 1793 & n.27 (1995) (explaining the manner in which
premiums are typically calculated).
9 Of course, generally speaking an insurance company will not sell insurance worth more than the
replacement cost of property for fear of moral hazard. The concern is that the insured will take less care
now that she is insured-for instance, driving more recklessly-particularly if she is insured for more
than the value of the property. However, an insurance company may not know the insured's subjective
valuation of the property. The insurer also may not have information regarding defects to the property
that lower its value. So it is entirely possible that an insured party could end up with insurance greater
than the value of the property being insured.
98 This can occur in other contractual contexts as well. See Jim Leitzel, Damage Measures and
Incomplete Contracts, 20 RAND J. Econ. 92, 97 (1989) (suggesting that courts can create a circularity
if they use typical private reliance as a measure of reasonable reliance damages, which in turn will
influence the degree to which parties are willing to rely upon promises).
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The litigation related to the attacks on the World Trade Center on
September 11, 2001, offers an example of how these incentives might
operate.99 In July of 2001, a real estate developer (World Trade Center
Properties or WTCP) leased the Trade Center from its owner, the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey, for approximately $2.8 billion.00
When the towers were brought down by terrorists using airplanes as
weapons, WTCP sued the airlines for negligence, arguing that the terrorists
would not have been able to take control of the airplanes had the airlines
taken reasonable care in securing them against hijackers.o'0 The court held
that the fair measure of the Trade Center's market value was the lease that
WTCP had just signed with the Port Authority-$2.8 billion.02 As the
Trade Center's replacement cost was much higher, this was the full
recovery to which the WTCP would be entitled. 03 Here, as in the
hypothetical example above, the court relied upon the arm's length bargain
between WTCP and the Port Authority to establish the market value of the
Trade Center. As the court explained, "a recent sale price for the subject
asset, negotiated by [the] parties at arm's length, is the 'best evidence' of
its market value."'0
When it signed the lease with the Port Authority, the WTCP
undoubtedly understood that a court would look to that lease to estimate the
value of the Trade Center if it was damaged by a tort. The WTCP thus had
an incentive to artificially inflate the rental price. The Trade Center had
already once been subjected to a terrorist attack, and the WTCP insured the
buildings for over $3.5 billion against any damage, including damage from
a terrorist act. 0 Of course, it would not have made sense for the WTCP
simply to pay a higher price for additional insurance. There was only some
small probability that the Trade Center would be damaged by a third party
(who could then be made to pay), and so each additional dollar that it paid
to the Port Authority would likely lead to only a few additional cents of
recovery.
But price is rarely the only term in a contract. The lease may have
committed the Port Authority to provide related services, financing for the
9 In re Sept. I1th Litig., 590 F. Supp. 2d 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
'oo Id. at 536.
1ot Id.
102 Id. at 540-44. New York law, which governed the case, provided that a tort plaintiff whose
property was damaged is entitled to the lesser of (1) the property's market value or (2) its replacement
cost. Id. at 541 (citing Hartshorn v. Chaddock, 31 N.E. 997, 998 (N.Y. 1892)).
103 Id. at 541-43.
10 Id at 547 (quoting Schonfeld v. Hilliard, 218 F.3d 164, 178 (2d Cir. 2000)).
'os Id. at 538-39.
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lessor, or any number of other benefits. The WTCP thus could have
arranged to purchase other positive terms in the lease for a higher lease
price, figuring that it had a chance to recoup the higher price if the WTCP
was damaged by a third party in tort. For instance, there might be some
other contract term that the Port Authority would be willing to provide for
$100 million and that WTCP would value at $98 million. It would be
inefficient for the parties to agree to this term. But if the WTCP believed
that there was a 3% chance that the Trade Center would be damaged or
destroyed in a tortious action, then it would have an incentive to agree to
the term because it could recoup 3% of the cost: ($100 million x 3%) + $98
million = $101 million, which is greater than $100 million. The implication
is that using market agreements between two parties to assess tort damages
upon a third party can lead to inefficient behavior by the two contracting
parties, not just the third-party tortfeasor.oI
These examples may seem farfetched in the context of automobile
insurance, where most policies do not offer the car's owner the opportunity
to specify an insured amount, or the World Trade Center, where an act of
terrorism may seem too unlikely to affect behavior. 07 But its applicability
to patent law is much more straightforward. When a patent holder P agrees
to license a patent to a licensee L1, it must anticipate that this license will
be used to set damages in any future litigation between P and future
licensees L 2 or L3 . Accordingly, P has an incentive to drive the price it sets
with Li as high as it possibly can.
How would P go about this? As a first step, it might engage in hard
bargaining, refusing to license the patent for a reasonable amount. The
social cost is that licensing agreements might become much less common if
patent holders refuse to license their intellectual property for reasonable
sums that approximate expected trial outcomes. The result could be a
decrease in licensing and an increase in socially costly trials.
106 There are other contexts in which similar types of third-party problems can arise. For instance,
it is sometimes necessary to value goods sold or transferred within related legal entities, as when a
parent corporation sells a component to a subsidiary. There is no true market price, because the parties
are not bargaining at arm's length. Nonetheless, that sale may be subject to taxation in a particular
jurisdiction, and the "transfer price"-the price the parent corporation "charges" the subsidiary-is the
basis for the tax. Parties have obvious incentives to deflate internal transfer prices (to avoid taxes), and
so courts will often look to third-party transactions to set a price. For instance, if the parent corporation
sold the same component to an unrelated third party, the court might use the price of that transaction to
set the transfer price for the component. The problem, of course, is that this creates an incentive for the
parent corporation to sell to the third party at an artificially low price in order to create tax savings when
it sells the same component to its subsidiary.
107 See Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REv.
771, 821-24 (1982) (suggesting that insured parties will not use insurance contracts strategically where
the likelihood of a triggering event is low).
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An alternative would be for P to package a patent license with other
valuable inducements in order to obtain a higher price. The typical patent
license includes just two terms: a royalty payment and a license for the
patent for a period of years.10 Yet this need not necessarily be the case. Just
as the WTCP might have obtained more favorable loan terms or any
number of other contractual benefits in exchange for a higher lease price, P
might provide subsidiary benefits-in addition to the patent license itself-
in exchange for greater royalties. P could offer to share technical
information with L;, make available its employees to assist Li in utilizing
the patented technology,1 09 promise Li a discount on future patent licenses,
package the patent license with a trademark license or other intellectual
property, or any number of other inducements. Even if P is effectively
"selling" the good or service for less than it is worth (if L; will not take it
for full value), the exchange is still worthwhile for P if it will increase the
royalties it might eventually receive from L 2 or L 3 .
Variations abound. P might negotiate a license in which it absolves L;
of responsibility for all past and future infringement while appearing to be
selling a license only for a portion of that time period." 0 For instance,
suppose that L; has sold 1 million allegedly infringing units of a product
and intends to sell 1 million more. Imagine that P and L; agree upon a
royalty of $1 per unit. P could offer L, a blanket license for a lump sum
payment of $1.5 million, which represents a discount of $500,000
compared with what L; might have expected to pay. P could then structure
the license so that it only references Li's future conduct, making it appear
as if L, is actually paying a royalty rate of $1.50 per unit.
Alternatively, P and Li might negotiate a license that contains a
restrictive geographic limitation that is in fact meaningless to L;. For
instance, the license might permit L; to sell only in California, but L; might
do business only in California in the first place. When it comes time for a
court to interpret the P-Li license, P might falsely claim that the price of
the license was discounted dramatically because of the geographic
limitation. A patent owner might similarly employ a meaningless
restriction on the field or scope of the license-"This license only applies
to the manufacture of automobile components."-for a firm that is only in
the business of manufacturing automobile components. The patent holder
l08 See 3 JOHN JAROSZ & ROBERT GOLDSCHEIDER, ECKSTROM'S LICENSING IN FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC OPERATIONS § 5:1 (2015) ("There is undoubtedly a large number of naked patent licenses
regularly granted which are unaccompanied by rights to use other forms of intellectual property.").
109 See generally Lee, supra note 85, at 1516 (arguing that patent license can facilitate this type of
knowledge transfer).
110 See Keele, supra note 5, at 228 (describing a similar type of arrangement).
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might even editorialize within the licensing document itself in an attempt to
convince a future court that the true value of the patent is higher. A patent
holder could write into a license, "This license is being granted on
favorable terms due to the significant uncertainty regarding whether the
licensee's product infringes the patent."
These concerns are not hypothetical. In 2013, Microsoft and Motorola
found themselves in litigation over the royalty Microsoft owed Motorola
for licenses to its patents on WiFi technology."' Motorola argued that
Microsoft should pay a 2.25% royalty, and to buttress this argument, it
introduced into evidence an agreement it had negotiated with VTech-
another manufacturer-at that rate. The court noted, however, that VTech
had actually paid Motorola relatively little under the license-thousands,
not millions, of dollars-which implied that the royalty rate may have been
relatively unimportant to VTech.11 2 Moreover, Motorola and VTech had
reached agreement "on the eve of a hearing .. . at which Motorola relied on
the agreement as evidence of the reasonableness of its royalty demands"
against Microsoft."' Though it did not say so explicitly, the court appeared
to believe that Motorola had negotiated the VTech license in an attempt to
inflate the perceived value of its patent. It thus rejected the VTech license
as a valid standard of comparison."14
Similarly, in Ericsson, Inc. v. InterDigital Communications Corp.,'" a
third party (Nokia) accused InterDigital of artificially inflating the value of
its patents in order to drive up the licensing price that Nokia would be
required to pay. InterDigital had agreed to license patents to Nokia for a
price based in part on what other firms would pay InterDigital to license the
same patents."' InterDigital then succeeded in negotiating a lucrative
license with Ericsson and demanded a substantial payment from Nokia.
Nokia, in return, accused InterDigital of strategically structuring its license
with Ericsson so as to extract a higher payment from Nokia. This example
is perhaps more acute than the typical case in which licenses are used to
compute damages because the price of Nokia's license depended directly
and explicitly on the agreement between InterDigital and Ericsson.
Nonetheless, the same types of concerns pervade both situations.
111 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C 10-1 823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25,
2013).
112 Id. at *67.
114 id.
" 418 F.3d 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
116 Id. at 1219.
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Because of these concerns, courts generally do their best to prevent
arrangements that encompass more than just patent licenses from infecting
license-based valuations. If a patent license includes additional benefits-
above and beyond a simple license to the patent-courts typically refuse to
treat the license as evidence of a reasonable royalty.1'7 As noted, this is
entirely appropriate in the context of litigation damages where the only
benefit "purchased" by the defendant is a license to use the patent. P might
still attempt to hide the other terms of the deal, describing the royalty rate
in one document and leaving the other inducements for a separate
document or no document at all. If it were later discovered that a license
relied upon by the court contained other, unstated terms, it might be
possible to reopen the damages judgment based on fraud on the court.
Nonetheless, it will be incumbent upon courts and parties to remain vigilant
in policing these types of behaviors. As courts rely more and more upon
licenses for measuring reasonable royalties, patent owners will have
incentives to inflate licensing prices and then attempt to obscure or conceal
that inflation by any means available to them.
It is worth noting that the effects detailed in this Section and in
Section II.A push in opposite directions. Because licenses are necessarily
probabilistic calculations of expected trial outcomes-with victory for the
patent holder uncertain-they will tend to depress damages calculations at
trial. At the same time, patentees have an incentive to inflate the price of
licensing agreements, even at the expense of inefficient transactions, which
will tend to increase damages calculations at trial. It may be tempting to
conclude that these effects will balance one another out, or at least come
close enough to doing so that it is safe to ignore them. But this would be
error. It would be pure fortuity if the two effects negated one another, and
there is no reason to expect that they would. Moreover, the price distortion
from the former effect-the fact that licenses represent settlement of
uncertain patent claims-will likely dwarf any distortion that patentees can
introduce by inflating license prices. If a given patent is only 50% likely to
be valid and infringed-which may, if anything, be an overestimate of the
patent's probability of success-then the licensing price for the patent will
be discounted by 50%. Opportunities for patent holders to inflate the
licensing price of a patent through contract to the same degree are most
likely rare. Nonetheless, any type of contractual manipulation is harmful
both for the mispricing it can cause, and for the social waste and rent-
seeking it generates.
117 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
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III. A WAY FORWARD?
The question that remains is whether there exists a solution to the
problems described above. Is there a mechanism by which courts can
render patent licenses a useful guide to calculating reasonable royalty
damages? It is on this issue that courts and commentators have floundered.
This Part takes up the challenge of finding such a solution.
A. The Selection ofLicenses
As an initial step, courts should attempt to select those licenses that
provide the most accurate estimate of damages. The dollar value of a
license (roughly) represents the underlying value of the patent discounted
by the probability that the patent will be found invalid or not infringed at
trial. If the parties believe that there is only a 10% chance that a court will
find the patent valid and infringed, the license value will be 10% of the
patent's underlying value-which is what the court is attempting to
discover."' If the parties believe that there is a 50% chance that a court will
find the patent valid and infringed, then the parties will agree to license the
patent for 50% of the patent's underlying value. Accordingly, the most
accurate gauge of a patent's value will be provided by licenses negotiated
by parties who agreed that a patent was 100% likely to be found valid and
infringed. If the parties had no doubt as to the expected outcome at trial,
then they would likely have negotiated a licensing amount approximately
equivalent to d-the expected damages at trial and the value that the court
is seeking to discover. More generally, the greater the probability that the
patent owner would prevail at trial (per the beliefs of the parties to a
licensing negotiation), the closer the value of the license to the "true" value
of the patent, and the greater the weight that license should be afforded by a
court when assessing damages.
In many cases, this means that licenses negotiated as litigation
settlements will be more accurate gauges of patent value than licenses
negotiated outside of litigation. In particular, the most reliable indicator of
value will be a license negotiated in the course of a trial that the patent
owner was winning, or (better yet) winning handily. t 9 The closer the
plaintiff is to being 100% certain of prevailing, the more accurate the value
118 See supra notes 59-71 and accompanying text.
119 For the purposes of using a license to indicate the value of a patent, it does not matter why the
patent owner is winning the case. All that matters is that the parties believe it is very likely that the
patent will be held valid and infringed. The one exception is if the defendant is at risk of being forced to
pay treble damages for willful infringement. See John Dragseth, Note, Coerced Waiver of the Attorney-
Client Privilege for Opinions of Counsel in Patent Litigation, 80 MINN. L. REv. 167, 171-72 (1995);
see also 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (granting courts the authority to impose treble damages). The threat of
treble damages would distort the licensing price.
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of the license. Courts should thus look for licenses that were negotiated
under circumstances that were highly unfavorable to the defendant. If the
defendant has received an unfavorable claim construction rulingl2 0 or had
its invalidity defenses thrown out on summary judgmentl 2 ' and elects to
settle, it is safe to assume that the plaintiff and defendant believe it is
highly probable that the patent will be found valid and infringed-surely
more probable than they did before the trial started. A defendant who is
losing at trial will often see the writing on the wall and settle the case for
close to the patent's full value. To be clear, the point is comparative: if
courts must use existing licenses, they are better off with licenses
negotiated when the defendant was losing at trial.'2 2
Recall the issue in LaserDynamics, described in Part I: the parties
introduced twenty-nine licenses into evidence, twenty-eight of which were
for amounts of $1 million or less, and one of which-the BenQ
settlement-was for $6 million.'2 3 The BenQ settlement ended a lawsuit in
which the defendant had already been repeatedly sanctioned, faced a stark
disadvantage at trial, and was very likely to lose. 2 4 The BenQ license was
thus an extreme outlier-and of all the licenses in evidence, it was the one
that most accurately captured the value of the patent. This is precisely
because BenQ was so likely to lose at trial.12 5 Six million dollars is the
120 Claim construction is the process by which a court interprets or construes the claim terms in a
patent. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (outlining the procedure for
courts to construe claims).
121 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (describing the various bases upon which a defendant might
argue that a patent is invalid).
122 Another advantage of using licenses negotiated as settlements to trials is that by the time the
license was negotiated, a substantial proportion of litigation costs will already have been sunk and
should not affect the amount of the license. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. This is yet
another respect in which the courts' preference for licenses negotiated outside of litigation is
backwards. The less the parties have already spent on litigation, the more that litigation costs could
distort licensing terms. Licenses negotiated as settlements to litigation-after the parties have already
invested some resources in litigating-should be less distorted by potential litigation costs than licenses
negotiated before litigation has begun.
12 694 F.3d 51, 58 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
124 See id. ("The district court had allotted BenQ one-third less time than Mr. Kamatani for voir
dire, opening statement, and closing argument. . . .").
125 Of course, it is possible that the BenQ settlement was inflated by the prospect that the court
might impose treble damages on BenQ for willful infringement or force BenQ to pay LaserDynamics's
attorneys' fees. But the case provides no indication of this. Willful infringement generally has little to
do with a party's (and its lawyers') behavior at trial. It can only be based upon conduct that preceded
the filing of a lawsuit for infringement. See, e.g., Pacing Techs., LLC v. Garmin Int'l, Inc., No. 12-CV-
1067 BEN (WMC), 2013 WL 444642, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2013). Attorneys' fees, which at the
time LaserDynamics was decided could have been awarded on the basis of litigation misconduct, are a
more realistic possibility. See Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int'l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381
(Fed. Cir. 2005), abrogated by Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., No. 12-1184, slip
op. (U.S. Apr. 29, 2014). However, it is worth noting that the district court had already fined BenQ
$500,000 for misconduct during the litigation. LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 58. This sum was a sunk
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amount that a defendant was willing to pay LaserDynamics when it seemed
certain that it would lose at trial and be made to pay one way or another; $1
million (or less) was the amount that licensees were willing to pay when
there was some substantial likelihood that they would prevail if it came to a
trial. The LaserDynamics court should have adopted exactly the opposite
posture: it should have treated the BenQ settlement as its guiding star and
relegated the other twenty-eight licenses to secondary status.
In fact, even a license negotiated in the midst of a trial the plaintiff
was losing can still be highly probative under certain conditions. Suppose
the plaintiff loses important claim construction and summary judgment
motions and settles immediately afterward. If a later court can reconstruct
the parties' beliefs as to the plaintiffs likelihood of victory by reading the
claim construction and summary judgment rulings, it can use that
information-plus the amount of the settlement-to reconstruct the value
of the patent. Of course, it might be difficult to discern the plaintiffs'
beliefs from the cold record. But at minimum, the fact that the earlier court
decided some legal issues and left a written record of the decision provides
a great deal more information than is typically present when a license is
negotiated outside of litigation.
Of course, licenses negotiated as settlements to trial will not always
provide more accurate guides than licenses negotiated outside of trial. The
probability of prevailing at trial, even against the same patent owner, can
differ widely from licensee to licensee. This is primarily because they may
be selling different products with different probabilities of infringing the
patent.126 There may be cases in which a license negotiated outside of
litigation provides the most accurate guide to patent value because that
licensee happens to believe it has the lowest probability of success at trial.
But in the aggregate, the licenses that provide the most accurate indications
of value will be those negotiated in the midst of trials that were going well
for plaintiffs and poorly for defendants.
cost that BenQ would be forced to pay regardless of whether it settled, so it could not have affected the
settlement amount. And BenQ might reasonably have expected that no further sanction would be
forthcoming, given that it had already been made to pay.
126 If the patent is invalid, it is invalid with respect to all potential infringers. See Greene, supra
note 75, at 2. But some putative infringers might make products that almost certainly infringe, while
others might manufacture products that are highly unlikely to do so. Similarly, some licenses may have
been negotiated under greater or lesser threats of holdup, though the holdup concern diminishes as
injunctions become rarer. All things being equal, litigation settlements will typically involve a greater
threat of holdup than licenses outside of litigation because the defendant is already engaging in
potentially infringing conduct. But the relationship is not absolute: it is possible for a litigation
settlement to involve zero holdup risk (if the defendant has made no product-specific investments),
while any given license taken outside of litigation could involve substantial holdup risk (if the
defendant has made substantial product-specific investments).
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This is why courts' and commentators' hostility toward litigation
settlements as a gauge of patent damages is not just misguided but
backward. 27 In refusing to consider licenses negotiated during litigation,
courts have ignored not merely a useful source of information, but in many
cases the most useful source of information. Of course, that is not to say
that licenses negotiated in litigation will necessarily be terribly useful,
particularly when the licensee was not faring poorly. These licenses still
represent only floors to a patent's value, not accurate point estimates. But
in many cases the courts will have no better options.
B. An Estimated Multiplier
Another solution would be for the court assessing damages to apply a
multiplier to an existing license. If a court concludes that the parties to an
existing license believed there was a 25% probability that the patent was
valid and infringed, it could simply multiply the license value fourfold and
assess damages in that amount.128 This solution seems promising (and
simple) at first glance, but it runs immediately into the problem of private
information that permeates this issue. The court needs to know how the
parties to the license perceived the strength of the patent-what
probabilities did they assign to validity and infringement?'29 The only truly
reliable information on this question is in the possession of the parties to
the license, and it is very unlikely that the court could ever discover this
information. In most cases what information that exists will be protected by
attorney-client privilege.13 0 If a licensing party formed a belief about the
probability of invalidity or infringement, it likely did so in the context of a
communication with its lawyers."' Even where the relevant information is
127 See sources cited supra notes 41-42.
128 See Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating Reasonable
Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 627, 641-43 (2010) (suggesting that royalties should be
"enhanced" when translating existing licenses into patent damages, but providing no guidance on what
that enhancement should be based on or how to calculate it); Taylor, supra note 5, at 131 (suggesting
that "adjustments" be made to license values, without specifying what those adjustments might be); see
also Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 5, at 797 & n.133. None of these scholars recognize or analyze the
advantages and problems involved in such an approach as detailed in this Section.
129 See supra Section II.A.
130 See generally Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md. 1974) (defining and
describing the scope of the attorney-client privilege); In re Rivastigmine Patent Litig., 237 F.R.D. 69
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (same); see also Dragseth, supra note 119 (analyzing situations in which parties can be
forced to disclose otherwise privileged information).
131 One radical solution might be to allow discovery of attorney work product involved in valuing
patents for licensing. This would allow courts to discover the subjective probabilities that parties
attached to the likelihood a patent would be found valid and infringed. However, such a breach of the
attomey-client privilege would likely create other significant problems and represents a substantial
departure from well-established law.
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discoverable, there may be no written record; the court would need to rely
upon the testimony of the parties. And of course, the patent owner has no
particular incentive to testify forthrightly and there is nothing to prevent it
from artificially inflating the patent's value.
In the alternative, a court might seek objective indications of the
probabilities that underlay an existing license. When the parties present
expert evidence on damages, their experts might include estimates of the ex
ante probability that a patent would be found valid and infringed-in other
words, the expert's best guess about the parties' beliefs, at the time the
license was negotiated, of the probability that the patent owner would
prevail at trial.132 Or, for that matter, the court might hire its own expert or
special master to provide an independent evaluation of the same question.133
In essence, the court would construct a miniature trial on the merits of the
prior license in an attempt to recreate the terms of the bargain that the
parties intended. Indeed, it appears that some patent damages experts have
begun suggesting multipliers in their expert reports.13 4 In theory, courts
could draw upon experts' recommendations and attempt to calculate
multipliers to license values.
Yet there are (at least) four significant problems with this approach.
The first is that it involves using objective information to answer a
fundamentally subjective question. When an expert attempts to assess the
likelihood that a patent would have been held valid and infringed in a prior
litigation, the expert must endeavor to determine the parties' perceptions of
the patent's strength at the time the license was negotiated. But there is no
reason to believe that this expert's guess will hit anywhere close to the
mark. The expert might discover important prior art that the licensee could
not find. Or the expert might miss important prior art that the licensee
132 Cf Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 905 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (Posner, J.)
(discussing the role that the damages expert plays in establishing reasonable royalty damages at trial).
133 This practice is relatively rare, but it does occur on occasion. One instance was the Apple v.
Motorola litigation before Judge Posner. See Order of March 29, 2012, No. 1:11 -cv-08540 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 29, 2012) (Posner, J.), https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/illinois/ilndce/
1:2011cv08540/262961/693/0.pdfts=1376969325 [https://perma.cc/867Z-9JC3] (order announcing
court-appointed expert witness); see also FED. R. EVID. 706.
134 However, reported cases in which experts are even permitted to testify in favor of multipliers
are few and far between. Compare Mondis Tech., Ltd. v. LG Elecs., Inc., Nos. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE,
2:08-CV-478-TJW, 2011 WL 2417367, at *7 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2011) (allowing an expert to testify
that an existing royalty should be tripled), with Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Rose Elecs., No. C06-
1711RSL, 2013 WL 8844098, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 2013) ("[T]here is no indication that Dr.
Kerr's chosen method of adjustment is anything more than an arbitrary multiplier based on factors and
statistics having nothing to do with the patents or parties in this case.").
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possessed.' Similarly, the expert might have at her disposal a set of
arguments that the prior licensee did not, or lack some legal theory that the
prior licensee viewed as critical. Using an expert to estimate a prior
licensee's view of its prospects at trial rests on a grand assumption: the
expert will have access to the same evidence and the same legal arguments
as the prior licensee. It is of course possible that this assumption will hold
in one case or another, but there is little reason to believe that it will
consistently be true. After all, the damages expert is operating at the end of
a full trial on the merits, during which the parties have presumably
produced every significant piece of evidence and argument available.' 36 The
prior license might have been negotiated well before any trial, after much
less investigation and study.
The second problem is that the prior licensing negotiation involved
private information that an expert in a later case cannot access. The
infringement issues in the instant case might differ dramatically from the
infringement question that confronted the parties to the earlier license. The
prior licensee (LI) might have been producing a very different product from
the product that is at issue in the current litigation between the patent owner
(P) and the new putative infringer (L 2). Moreover, with respect to the prior
license, Li might be in possession of critical information related to
infringement. After all, it was Li's product that was alleged to infringe the
patent. L2 may have difficulty accessing this private information. Li is not a
party to the lawsuit and can be served only with certain types of
discovery.'3 7 And without that information, L 2's expert can only guess at
the probability that L; would have been found to infringe.
The third problem with attempting to estimate a multiplier for a prior
license is that it forces the parties to make arguments during the damages
phase of the trial that directly contradict the arguments they made during
the liability phase. The defendant will argue that the court should apply a
low multiplier-perhaps a multiplier of 1-to the prior license when
calculating damages. In other words, the defendant will argue that when P
1 Prior art is any information in the public domain that predates the patented invention. A patent
can be invalidated as obvious or not novel on the basis of prior art. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHtN
FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 42-49 (6th ed. 2013).
136 See Timothy Flynn, Jr., Note, On "Borrowed Wits": A Proposed Rule for Attorney Depositions,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1956, 1962 (1993) ("The second fundamental justification offered for the adversary
model is that its incentive structure makes it the best system for eliciting truth.").
'37 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 30 (allowing depositions of nonparties), with FED. R. Clv. P. 33, 35,
36 (barring interrogatories and other types of discovery directed at nonparties). Courts are also more
likely to quash subpoenas of documents directed at third parties than parties to a suit, 7 ROBERT A.
MATTHEWS, JR., ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 41:187 (2008), and more likely to require the party
requesting discovery to pay the third party's costs. See Linder v. Calero-Portocarrero, 251 F.3d 178,
182-83 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Legal Voice v. Stormans, Inc., 738 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2013).
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licensed the patent to L1 , it was a near certainty that the patent was valid
and infringed. This follows a trial in which the defendant argued precisely
the contrary (particularly with respect to invalidity). The patent owner (P),
for its part, would argue for a high multiplier, claiming that when it
negotiated with Li it was doubtful that a court would find the patent valid
and infringed. The patent owner has of course just spent the entire trial
arguing the opposite: that the patent is obviously valid and infringed.
Accordingly, both parties would find themselves trying to proffer
arguments that they are likely estopped from raising due to positions they
had taken earlier in the litigation."' The result would be an awkward mess
for the court. To be sure, these conflicts between the liability and damages
phases might limit the sorts of outlandish claims the parties might try to
make. But while that might be a good mechanism for reaching a moderate
result, it will not necessarily lead to an accurate one."'
Finally, even if the parties' experts manage to produce insightful and
accurate estimates of the licensing multiple, the court will likely misuse or
even ignore them. Consider the point at trial at which this issue will arise.
The judge and jury have just completed a trial in which the patent was
found to be valid and infringed. They are now being asked to find-
contrary to what they have just decided-that there was a significant ex
ante probability that they would have reached the opposite decision. This is
an implausible mental task for nearly anyone, including judges.14 People
too often fall prey to motivated reasoning-the tendency to believe
selectively those facts and arguments that support their prior conclusions
and dispositions.141 Most judges or jurors would be hard-pressed to give a
fair hearing to an expert who claims that their decision was less than 100%
foreordained. Courts and juries will consistently underestimate the
appropriate multiplier to apply. In many cases they will ignore the need for
a multiplier entirely. It is thus not surprising that I have been unable to
138 See Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1217-20 (6th Cir. 1990) (analyzing and
describing judicial, equitable, and collateral estoppel).
139 This particular problem could be avoided if the court simply appointed its own expert. But then
the court would lose the benefit of the adversarial process and the high-powered incentives it creates.
There is no guarantee that the court's expert will obtain all of the most relevant evidence or raise the
most important arguments on either side.
140 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630, 653-54 (1999); Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated
Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990); Stephen A. Siegel, The Constitution on Trial: Article Ill's
Jury Trial Provision, Originalism, and the Problem of Motivated Reasoning, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
373, 444-48 (2012).
141 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein,
Institutional Flip-Flops 18 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 501,
2015), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2553285 [http://perma.cc/K4QB-HC5N]
(discussing motivated reasoning in the context of institutional questions).
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locate even a single instance of a court applying or discussing the use of a
multiplier in a published damages opinion, even though many have used
licenses to set reasonable royalty damages. 142
C. A Standard Multiplier
Instead of attempting to calculate a multiplier for any given license or
case, courts could instead apply a standard, fixed multiplier to all licenses
across all cases. For instance, patent plaintiffs prevail in approximately
25% of all patent cases.1 43 If we assume, as a very rough cut, that any given
patent owner has a 25% chance ex ante of prevailing against any given
alleged infringer,'" then the appropriate multiplier is four.1 45 Courts have
thus far appeared resistant to using a standard multiplier on the ground that
it lacks a connection to the case at bar.1 46 However, that is precisely the
advantage of such an approach. The use of a standard multiplier would free
courts and experts from the informational problems described above. It
would also eliminate the concern that judges and juries would
underestimate the appropriate multiplier due to motivated reasoning.1 47
The use of a standard multiplier would create other problems, though.
Even if the standard multiplier is correct in the aggregate, in the sense that
the average license involves a patent that was 25% likely to be found valid
and infringed, it will still overcompensate and undercompensate most
patent holders. If the proper multiplier for a license is greater than four, the
standard multiplier will undercompensate the owner of that patent if it
prevails at trial. If the proper multiplier is less than four, the standard
multiplier will overcompensate the patent owner. The patent owner will be
properly compensated only in the rare case where the particular licensed
patent was exactly 25% likely to be found valid and infringed at trial.
Under normal circumstances, this type of systematic overcompensation and
142 See supra Part I.
143 Mark A. Lemley, The Fractioning of Patent Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
COMMON LAW 504, 505 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed. 2013).
'" This is of course an entirely heroic assumption. It is highly possible that the probability of
prevailing against a party that eventually agreed to license a patent diverges substantially from the
actual probability of prevailing at trial, due to selection effects. The point is not to arrive at the perfect
number, but just to find a rough and ready estimate that can be deployed across cases. As the discussion
will demonstrate, there are substantial problems that accompany even this use of a rough number that
go beyond any question of accuracy of what that number should precisely be.
145 1 / 0.25 = 4.
146 See, e.g., Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Rose Elecs., No. C06-171 IRSL, 2013 WL 8844098, at
*4-5 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 2013) (prohibiting an expert from testifying in favor of a standard
multiplier).
147 See supra Section III.B.
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undercompensation would be a problem.1 48 After all, it is not the aggregate
outcome that matters. If certain types of inventors are being systematically
undercompensated, they may reduce their investments in research and
development. And if other inventors are being systematically
overcompensated, they might engage in socially wasteful expenditures in
order to acquire more patents. Wastefully high levels of resources will flow
to the types of inventions that are being overcompensated, leaving other
types of innovation underfunded.
However, in this context, the overcompensation and
undercompensation may turn out to be a feature, rather than a bug. The
reason is that the patent owners who will be undercompensated are those
who succeeded in licensing patents with a low probability of winning at
trial. For instance, if a patent owner (P) and licensee (L;) agree that there is
only a 10% chance that the patent will be found valid and infringed, they
will discount the licensing price by a factor of 10. If P eventually prevails
against a subsequent licensee (L2) at trial, the proper multiplier would be
10. A standard multiplier of 4 would undercompensate this patent holder.
By contrast, the patent owners who will be overcompensated are those who
licensed patents with a high probability of winning at trial. If P and L, had
agreed that the patent was 75% likely to be found valid and infringed, the
appropriate multiplier (in the P v. L2 trial) would be 4/3 or approximately
1.33. A multiplier of 4 would overcompensate P.
This means that parties with strong patents who assert good claims
will be overcompensated, while parties with dubious patents who assert
weak claims will be undercompensated. From a social perspective this is
desirable, as Anup Malani and I have argued in prior work.'49 A standard
multiplier will dissuade patent owners from demanding licenses where they
have only a weak claim to validity and infringement, potentially curbing
some of the worst abuses perpetrated by so-called patent trolls.s0 At the
same time, a standard multiplier will reward parties with strong patents
who pursue only obviously infringing parties. This may be unnecessary, as
those types of patent owners are likely to be rewarded regardless, but it is
148 Cf Anthony Niblett, Case-by-Case Adjudication and the Path of the Law, 42 J. LEGAL STUD.
303, 304-06 (2013) (explaining, in the context of judging, that two extreme judges will not cancel one
another out but will instead likely produce extreme law).
149 See Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO. L.J. 637
(2013) (demonstrating that it can be socially beneficial to impose augmented penalties against parties
who assert weak patents and give augmented rewards to parties who assert strong patents).
150 See, e.g., T. Christian Landreth, Recent Development, The Fight Against "Patent Trolls:" Will
State Law Come to the Rescue?, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 100, 101-04 (2014) (describing the
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probably not especially harmfutl. 1 At least at first glance, this approach has
much to recommend it.
Yet there remains a significant problem with using a standard
multiplier. The problem lies with the circularity of using licenses to
calculate trial damages and vice versa, and the positive feedback loop that
it creates. Suppose that P is the owner of a strong patent that has never
been litigated or licensed. P demands that L; license the patent, and the
parties agree that the patent is 75% likely to be found valid and infringed.
The parties further agree that a court would likely award $10 million in
damages if P prevailed. They agree that Li will license the patent for $7.5
million.'52 Now P approaches L 2 -- who is selling a product similar to L;'s-
and demands that L2 license the patent. The parties agree that the patent is
75% likely to be found valid and infringed if the case were to go to trial.
But in light of the license between P and L;, the parties realize that if P
were to prevail at trial, the court might well award $30 million in
damages-the $7.5 million license between P and L,, adjusted upward by a
multiplier of 4.13 Facing a 75% chance of incurring a damages verdict of
$30 million, L2 will be forced to pay $22.5 million for a license, vastly
more than Li. And then, if P were to demand a license from a third putative
infringer L3 , the upward spiral in value will continue. The result will be
vast overcompensation of P. While some modest degree of
overcompensation might not be problematic, an uncontrolled upward spiral
in the value of the patent would almost surely lead to wasteful diversion of
resources.15 4
The same sort of spiral will occur, though in the downward direction,
with respect to weaker patents. Suppose P demands that L; license a patent
that both parties agree is 10% likely to be found valid and infringed at trial.
The parties further agree that a court would likely award $10 million in
damages if P prevailed. L, thus agrees to license the patent for $1 million.
P then approaches a similarly situated L2, and the parties agree that there is
151 See Malani & Masur, supra note 149, at 641-42 (arguing that it makes economic sense to
overreward prevailing patent owners in order to compensate them for the possibility that a court might
have errantly invalidated their patents); see also Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent
Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687 (2010) (describing the social costs of bad patents and arguing
that the Patent and Trademark Office should endeavor to prevent them from being granted); David
Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV. 677 (2012) (same).
152 $10 million x 0.75 = $7.5 million.
153 More conservatively, the court might award damages in the amount of $20 million, which is
halfway between the $10-million figure that the court might calculate with the help of experts, and $30
million, which the license would dictate. The effect on subsequent licenses would be the same; the
magnitude would just be slightly smaller.
154 See Malani & Masur, supra note 149, at 652-53 (explaining the social harm that can be caused
by dramatic overcompensation of patent owners, even when their patents are valid and infringed).
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a 10% probability that the patent would be found valid and infringed at
trial. Now, however, L 2 is facing potential liability of only $4 million if it
litigates and loses at trial because of the license between P and L1.'55
Accordingly, L2 will be willing to license the patent for only $400,000. Just
as the value of a strong patent will spiral upward, the value of a weaker
patent will spiral downward.
Again, it might be appropriate to undercompensate parties who assert
weaker patents.'5 6 But it could create harmful incentives and lead to other
types of wasteful behavior. For instance, if P has a weak case against LI but
knows that any settlement it reaches will harm it in future cases, it might
choose to litigate rather than settle."' This could lead to wasteful litigation
expenditures and social costs. Alternatively, P and L, might engage in other
types of socially wasteful behavior in an attempt to obscure the value of the
license or render it inapplicable to future cases. For instance, P might
bundle the patent license with other goods that Li neither wants nor needs,
such as trademarks or tacit knowledge. The result would be to eliminate the
license as a useful measure of patent value, using an inefficient and socially
costly transaction.
Put more formally, any time the standard multiplier M is greater than
1 / p (the inverse of the plaintiffs probability of success at trial), it will
create an upward spiral in value. Any time M < 1 / p, the standard
multiplier will create a downward spiral in value. Only when M happens to
be chosen perfectly-that is, M= 1 /p-will this spiral not develop.
The upshot is that while the static overcompensation and
undercompensation caused by using a standard license multiple might be
harmless or even desirable, the dynamic overcompensation and
undercompensation that results from feedback between licensing and trial
will be harmful. This speaks to the insuperable nature of the difficulties
generated from the licensing-litigation circularity."' Without some
mechanism for breaking this circularity, dynamic under- and
overcompensation will frustrate any attempt to use licenses as a reliable
155 Again, the court might settle on a value somewhere between $4 million and $10 million.
Regardless, the effect will be the same; only the magnitude of the effect will differ.
156 See Malani & Masur, supra note 149, at 657 (analyzing the effects of undercompensation on
patent owners).
157 On the other hand, P faces the risk that its patent would be invalidated at trial. But if P has a
valid patent, and the weakness in its case is that L, may not be infringing, then it has strong reasons to
proceed to trial rather than allowing L, to negotiate a license.
158 See supra Section II.B.
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measure of patent damages over time.1 59 The prospects for finding a true
market measure of patent value do not seem promising. 6 0
CONCLUSION
Courts inevitably struggle to assess reasonable royalty damages, and it
is only natural that they would turn to market-based measures such as
existing licenses. However, courts' attempts to use these licenses to
determine patent damages at trial are frustrated by three problems.
Calculating the underlying value of the patent from an existing license
requires private information that the court cannot access; doing so involves
a circularity that is difficult to evade; and parties to a license have
incentives to distort the value of that license in order to affect future
proceedings. There are various correctives that a court can employ,
including selecting the most information-rich licenses and applying a
multiplier to license values where appropriate. But even these measures
have limited efficacy.
It is in the nature of legal scholarship to write comedies rather than
tragedies.' 6' Each legal problem should be accompanied by a clever (and
preferably plausible) solution. But it does not seem that this story is meant
to end well. Finding an accurate measure of patent damages is critical, and
never more so than right now, as patents assume an ever more important
role in the legal landscape and damages take center stage. But existing
licenses cannot provide a useful guide to the value of a patent, only the bare
minimum of a valuation floor. Courts have no choice but to muddle
through technical analysis and expert reports per the remaining Georgia-
Pacific factors. There is no reliable substitute, and no other way to make
159 It is extremely common for a patent holder to approach multiple parties sequentially and
demand licenses. See, e.g., LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 58 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (noting that there were twenty-nine licenses on record). The dynamic problems caused by
licensing-litigation circularity are likely to exist across a broad swath of the relevant patents.
160 There are even more imaginative possibilities. One, which is suggested by recent work by Sarah
and Michael Abramowicz, would be to force parties to negotiate each element of a settlement separately
and sequentially, without comingling the separate issues. Sarah Abramowicz & Michael Abramowicz,
Severing Settlements (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). In the patent context,
Congress could require patent owners and licensees to negotiate damages and probability of
infringement separately. That is, instead of the two parties simply settling on a royalty, they would first
negotiate the damages they expect the court to assess against the defendant in the event the patent was
found valid and infringed. They would then negotiate the probability that the patent would in fact be
found valid and infringed at trial. The result would be a license that actually contained information
regarding the parties' view of the economic value of the patent. The problem with this arrangement is
the immense incentive to cheat; both parties would benefit from agreeing to an inflated damages figure
and a reduced probability. Accordingly, this proposal may not be easily imported to patent law.
Nonetheless, similar types of revelation mechanisms could hold promise as means of placing market
values on patents, and they are a fruitful subject for future study.
161 To my knowledge, Thomas Miles was the first to offer this observation.
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sense of the "true" value of a patent without creating a circularity. It is
unfortunate that courts will not be able to draw upon market indications of
value, but sometimes no guidance is better than guidance that leads astray.
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